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MIHALY

ARTICLE
Citizen Participation in the Making of
Environmental Decisions:
Evolving Obstacles and Potential Solutions
Through Partnership With Experts and
Agents
MARC B. MIHALY *
INTRODUCTION
Many public officials, whether city zoning administrators,
city council persons, state air pollution control board members,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule makers, or
commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
share a career reality: they spend some substantial portion of
their working lives hearing or reading testimony submitted by
members of the public, citizens who are not lawyers, not
professional stakeholder staff, and not trained experts in the
matter at hand. I spent the better part of three decades as an
attorney for both environmental citizen advocates and
governmental agencies, and have concluded that such citizen
participation is essential to our democratic experiment, especially
in the current effort to ensure that a representative government
can promote the socio-economic reorganization necessary to
reduce carbon emissions.
It is my experience, however, that while officials support
vigorously the concept of citizen participation, they acknowledge
privately that they rarely hear or read testimony from lay
participants that changes their mind or adds substance to their
*Associate Dean for the Environmental Law Program and Associate
Professor of Law at Vermont Law School. Marc Mihaly, through his law firm,
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, represented community groups, environmental
organizations, local governments, and regional governmental entities in
environmental, land use and energy matters. The author would like to thank
Joshua Glubiak, Benjamin Leoni, and Peter Scully for their dedicated editorial
assistance with this article.
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determinations. In testament to the power of an ideal and a
conflicting reality to co-exist, officials show genuine support for
the concept of citizen involvement and yet complain about lay
testimony in private or wish for less of it. They generally do not
pursue the conflict or engage in serious inquiry into the
inadequacies of citizen participation, the obstacles to valuable
input, or potential for true melioration.
This conceptual fog pervades especially the environmental,
land use, and energy arenas, which present decision-makers with
questions of both great public interest and great complexity. 1 On
the one hand, actors in the environmental endeavor remain
dedicated, for reasons both historic and developmental, to the
concept of the assertion of lay power, in part through citizen
participation, despite recent accusations that the movement has
lost its soul to technocratic leadership. 2 However, the daunting
complexity of the subject area and the underlying proceedings
renders much unassisted lay participation useless. This conflict
between the ideal and the real, and the resulting cognitive
dissidence, diminishes frank discussion of the barriers to effective
citizen participation and a search for potential solutions.
This dedication to the participatory ideal, one I share,
influences scholarly inquiry in the same way; reflexive and
uncritical support takes the edge off analysis of important
questions concerning the obstacles to citizen participation, and
the utility of unassisted citizen participation in rulemaking,
1. See PANEL ON PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION
MAKING & THE NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, 7 (Thomas Dietz & Paul C.
Stern eds., 2008), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=
12434 [hereinafter PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION
MAKING] (noting that “environmental decisions present very complex choices
among interests and values, so that the choices are political, social, cultural, and
economic, at least as much as the are scientific and technical”).
2. See, e.g., MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, DEATH OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM 6–11 (2004), available at http://www.thebreakthrough.org/
images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf (criticizing environmental leaders’
approach of “using science to define [a] problem as ‘environmental’ and crafting
technical policy proposals as solutions,” and calling for a “collective step back to
rethink everything”). Shellenberger & Nordhaus’ analysis misrepresents the
environmental movement to date in this and many other respects. See Douglas
A. Kysar, The Consultants Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041 (2008) (reviewing
Shellenberger & Nordhaus’ next and similar book BREAK THROUGH: FROM THE
DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM TO THE POLITICS OF POSSIBILITY (2007)).
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permitting and legislation. The literature falls roughly into two
categories. Many participation proponents tend to focus on
methods to increase participation in environmental matters
without giving sufficient attention to the obstacles. A recent
study conducted largely by social scientists is typical; in nearly
250 pages of analysis of public participation in environmental
decision-making, fewer than ten are devoted to the formidable
problems, which currently make most unassisted citizen
participation unhelpful to public officials and ineffectual. 3
Attorneys suffer from a similar tendency to let the
participatory ideal dull their sensibilities. One would think that
of all the actors in the decision-making play, the attorneys would
have the clearest heads on this issue. It is they, after all, who
often bring procedural, substantive and political expertise to lay
testimony. However, attorneys seem to experience as much as
any participant the distraction derived from the unexamined
archetype of citizen participation. One sees it in social situations
where attorneys who represent local citizens in environmental
and land use matters recount wonderful moments when
community clients decimate the opposition with colorful or
insightful testimony. Along with another legal aid attorney in
the mid-1970’s, I represented a group of low-income
environmentalists opposed to a large residential “new town”
south of San Francisco on a combination of gentrification and
environmental grounds. In front of an audience of nearly one
thousand attendees, testimony before the planning commission
addressed many issues, most related to intensification of use,
traffic, and open space. The developer’s attorney repeatedly
emphasized his client’s proposed dedication of hundreds of acres
for recreational use. None of my arguments concerning the
steepness of the dedicated land and its inappropriateness for
passive recreation approached the devastation wrought by my
clients who, in their testimony, exclaimed to the planning
commissioners: “We think the land proposed for dedication would
be useful, and here’s the user!” They then led a small Billy goat
down the central isle of the auditorium. She bleated loudly.
Every subsequent mention of the dedication brought laughter,
3. PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra
note 1, at 52-58, 60-62 (discussing formidable problems which make most
unassisted citizen participation unhelpful to public officials and ineffectual).
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and, of course, the silent recitation in the listener: “Oh yes, the
Billy goat land.”
Why do we love to tell such stories? It is because, as is often
the case with stories, the desire to perpetuate and strengthen
foundational myths animates the telling more than reality. Even
professional participants need, at some level, to believe in a
special or redemptive value of lay participation. Yet, as most of
us who practice public participation law know, in environmental
cases members of the general public rarely prepare or present the
effective public comment and testimony. It is the class of
professionals, usually attorneys and the consultant experts they
retain, who conceive, write (or edit), and orchestrate the
presentation of public testimony. In their absence, for reasons
discussed in this article, testimony frequently misses statutory or
regulatory deadlines, fails to raise the issues necessary to
exhaust administrative remedies, emphasizes policy issues of
concern to the testigant, rather than the decision-maker, and
makes points without foundation.
Such shortcomings form some of the basis for the other trend
in the literature, an opposition to enhanced citizen participation,
some of it scholarly and much political. 4 Rationalists and
representatives of economic stakeholders argue that citizen
participation, based on intuition rather than science, and
intrinsically parochial in nature, must be curtailed to allow
government to function, as it should. 5 These critics, motivated by
doubts about the intrinsic worth of citizen participation in the
scholarly case, or by opposition to its successes in the political
case, focus on the incapacities of unassisted lay participation.
They fail to evaluate adequately (or oppose), approaches to
enhancing the sophistication and effectiveness of citizen
participation. 6
We need to think further than participatory ideals, and yet
more sympathetically to participation than its critics. What are
4. See PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING,
supra note 1, at 54-58 (summarizing such opposition).
5. See discussion infra Part II.B and notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
6. The key is provision of attorneys and experts to citizen advocates. Efforts
such as Legal Aid, attorneys’ fees statutes, and enhanced standing have been
long opposed, with substantial success, by economic and political actors on the
right. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
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the true obstacles to citizen participation? Is modern
environmental decision-making susceptible to effective unassisted
lay participation? Who does most of the participation in the
environmental arena? This article addresses these issues from a
qualitative perspective, 7 and then addresses means to enhance
effective participation by lay citizenry, specifically contending
that the potential societal benefits of citizen participation accrue
where participants partner with experts and agents, usually
attorneys.
Part I of this article briefly reviews theories of public
participation and contends that, regardless of the underlying
political theory applied, the valuable societal benefits of public
participation accrue only where the involvement makes a true
difference in the decision-making process. Part II examines the
developing obstacles to unassisted citizen involvement. I propose
that in this era of implementation, environmental decisions
present issues sufficiently complex that lay participation cannot
successfully affect environmental decision-making unless assisted
by attorneys and experts. This complexity combines with the
evolution of environmental decision-making, away from
traditional public processes, toward contract and private
stakeholder negotiations, to render unassisted citizen
participation problematic and ineffectual. Utilizing the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) as an example of these
obstacles, Part III contrasts the participatory ideals embodied in
the structure of the Act with the reality of formalized and
ineffectual participation regimes designed by compliance
bureaucracies and communications consultants. Finally, Part IV
examines the benefits of a productive citizen-attorney-expert
team in the context of NEPA, in formal environmental
proceedings, and in informal processes such as negotiated
rulemaking, suggesting regimes by which such representation
could be provided.

7. Although a more quantitative analysis would be most beneficial, the
diversity of underlying issues, processes, and actors makes many such analyses
actually anecdotal and pose daunting obstacles to a meaningful empirical
analysis.
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THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING ARE
DIVERSE, BUT MATERIALIZE ONLY IF THE
PARTICIPATION HAS ACTUAL EFFECT.

A. Theories of Democracy and Participation
We must begin where most thought on participation resides.
What are the benefits of public participation? The positives of
public involvement are the subject of too many paeans,
publications, law review articles, and appellate opinions to cite
fully, 8 but they are briefly set out below. Before reaching the
benefits, one must start with the theories of participation. These
in turn flow from one’s view or model of modern democracy.
The model which is sometimes labeled rationalist, scientific,
progressive or synoptic, is one of the oldest. It conceives
government as led by persons who are neutral and wise, and
seeking the common good. The common good, in turn, represents
a determinable concept consisting, in its most modern
incarnation, of the highest utility for the greatest number of
citizens. 9 Advocacy of such a government of mandarins emerged
as one line of thought in the post-Civil War Republican Party,
matured during the Progressive Era, and found a modern
instrumentality in the administrative agencies brought to fruition

8. See, e.g., PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION
MAKING, supra note 1; Mark Stephen Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican
Tradition in Natural Resources Decision-Making, (U. of Colo. Law Sch. Research
Paper No. 08-02, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1082008; Thomas
Dietz, Theory and Method in Social Impact Assessment, SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY
54, 54-69 (1987); THOMAS C. BEIERLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (2002); FAIRNESS AND
COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 17 (Ortwin Renn, Thomas Webler &
Peter Wiedeman eds., 1995); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 Yale L.J. 359, 361 (1972) (describing the many
social advantages of public participation in administrative proceedings); Eliot S.
Metzger & John M. Lendvay, Commentary, Seeking Environmental Justice
Through Public Public Participation, 8 ENVTL. PRACTICE 104 (2006); Scenic
Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.
1965) (holding that there are many public interests, and that the governmental
agency alone could not protect these interests).
9. Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National
Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 57
(1996).
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in the Roosevelt administrations. 10 Public participation finds
value in such a model to the extent that it provides new and
valuable factual, theoretical or legal input to these technocratic
decision-makers, input which they could not obtain through the
exercise of their own expertise.
Commencing in the 1950’s (though some say, as early as
Madison) and still quite pervasive today, the pluralist ideal
contends that the common good does not exist as an independent
set of solutions objectively determinable by any leaders, be they
wise and knowledgeable, or otherwise. 11 Rather, the common
good emerges as a result of the bargaining of the issue-relevant
set of economic and social interest groups. 12 Ideal governmental
processes provide a forum for the negotiation, and ideal decisions
reflect the results of that bargaining. 13 Public participation in
such a model means effective representation of all interests
relevant to the policy issue in question.
More collectively oriented advocates emphasize that the
common good in a democracy represents much more than a
solution reached by wise leaders or negotiation to reach an
optimized highest good for the greatest number of individuals.
10. KENNETH F. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, 83,
fig. 3.2 (Westview Press 4th ed. 2004) (1982); ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE
INLAND SEA (1989) (A brilliant evocation of the scientific element in the pre-Civil
War Republican party and its efforts to find solutions to repeated flooding in the
Central Valley of California).
11. See generally, WILLIAM KELSO, AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THEORY: PLURALISM
AND ITS CRITICS (1978); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the
Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 631
(2008).
12. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Traces of Selfgovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 21 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32 (1985).
13. See Tonia Novitz & Phil Syrpis, Assessing Legitimate Structures for the
Making of Transnational Labour Law: The Durability of Corporatism, 35 INDUS.
L.J. 367, 372 (2006). Novitz & Syrpis note that
[t]he central pluralist idea, associated with the notion of participatory
democracy, is that diverse entrenched interests do not dissipate on the
election of national or local government by majority vote, but continue to
exist and can covertly influence policy-making at all levels. This idea leads
to a call for representation of interest groups at various levels of
government decision-making, so as to ensure that all those directly
affected, not only those with the greatest capital or social influence, can be
heard.
Id.
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For these advocates, contending under various labels, including
Civic Republicans or Universalists, the goal of government
includes fostering civic values in its citizens, embracing the
significant value of the concept of a common good, independent of
individual interests. 14 Civic Republicans propose a more complex
and iterative view of public participation under which the act of
participation in government itself creates and changes values and
thus interests, rather than simply reflecting ex ante values and
interests. 15 In this view, public participation has value not only
for the information it imparts to decision-makers, but also from
its educational value and transformative effect on the
participant. 16
B. Democratic and Participatory Theories in the
Environmental Context
Interestingly, the attributes of ideal public participation
necessary under each of these disparate views of democracy17 do
not conflict, but rather overlap. In other words, it is possible to
create a cumulated set of elements for a participatory model that
includes all of the required elements for each approach, although
for each camp the list would be over-inclusive. This complementarity has significance here because one needs all of these loosely
defined democratic theories to explain the exceptional value of
citizen participation to environmental decision-making in our
democracy. None of the theories, alone, will suffice.
The scientific, rationalist model has a special, perhaps
unique, place for environmental decision-making because the
environmental endeavor contends continuously with the conflict
between the existing demands of human society and the biological
and physical constraints of the earth. The nature of the natural
constraints may be debatable, but such constraints surely do exist
as a reality independent of competing socio-economic actors, and
are increasingly determinable through the application of
14. Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE. L.J. 1539, 155455 (1988); see generally ERIK OLSON, CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROPERTIES
OF DEMOCRACY (2005); Squillace, supra note 8, at 11-12.
15. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 27.
16. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 14, at 1545, 1587.
17. I find these three paradigms useful, but there are others. See, e.g., PUB.
PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 1, at 49.
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established scientific methodologies. 18 It is true that in many
other arenas, a government develops policy in light of what are at
least perceived as external “realities”—the laws of science and, at
least arguably, the observed or mathematically deduced “laws” of
economics. 19 But the biosphere imposes constraints that are
different in pervasiveness, flexibility and scale.
As to
pervasiveness, carrying capacity limitations operate at all levels,
from tiny landscapes (as to, for example, species protection), 20 to
regions (as to water and air pollution prevention), 21 to the planet
(as to carbon), 22 forcing the environment onto the agenda of
nearly every realm of government. As to flexibility, while society
has great flexibility as to the amount of inequality, social and
economic misfortune it will absorb, ecological limits simply are
what they are, and it is essential that decision-makers discover
and understand them. As to results, global warming, and
worldwide shortages of potable water, food and energy will
present decision-makers with potentialities that transcend most
endeavors. 23 Governmental entities that face such realities need,
and thus will seek, information that assists them in assessing
objective science regarding the impacts of policy alternatives.
It has been frequently contended, however, that it is not
citizen participation but instead expert staff and educated public
officials who provide the information that assists governmental
18. See J. Geider et al., Forum, Primary Productivity of Planet Earth:
Biological Determinants and Physical Constraints in Terrestrial and Aquatic
Habitats, 7 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOL. 849 (2001).
19. TONY LAWSON, ECONOMICS AND REALITY 280 (Routledge 2002) (1997)
(explaining how competing policy-oriented groups accept existing economic
conditions).
20. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006); Nathan F. Sayre, The
Genesis, History, and Limits of Carrying Capacity, 98 ANNALS ASS’N AM.
GEOGRS., 120 (2008).
21. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7401
(2006); Kyushik Oh et al., Determining development density using the Urban
Carrying Capacity Assessment System, 73 LANDSCAPE URBAN PLANN. J. 1 (2005).
22. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC TECHNICAL
PAPER VI, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WATER, 74 (Bryson Bates et al. eds., 2008)
[hereinafter IPCC], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/public
ations_and_data_technical_papers_climate_change_and_water.htm. See, e.g.,
American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); William E. Rees, Revisiting Carrying Capacity: Area-Based Indicators of
Sustainability, 17 POPUL.ENV’T (1996), available at http://dieoff.org/page110.
htm.
23. IPCC, supra note 22, at 41.
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entities in assessing the objective science. The arc of development of the administrative state and its expert commission, from
John Francis Adams to Louis Kahn, rests on the effort to seed
government with expertise. 24 Modern commentators have argued
that public participation interferes with such expertise. Such
public involvement, they contend, can be counterproductive to the
operation of good government, especially in the environmental
arena where, for example, lay perceptions of hazardous risk
contravene good science, 25 and repeated citizen litigation distorts
EPA’s priorities. 26 As a believer in good government, I agree with
many of these contentions. I have seen the waste of time in
content-less, repetitive and lengthy citizen comment.
A
thoughtful reading of A Civil Action27 leaves one mostly angry at
the protagonist attorney, the supposed hero, and at the system
that aids and abets his work, as he spends his and his client’s
time, money, and emotional energy for nothing. The real heroes
of the story are the EPA bureaucrats who eventually promulgate
effective standards for remediation.
Yet it is my experience, and the experience of many of my
colleagues in environmental advocacy, that insider staff and
officials frequently need outsider citizen input to make them
wise. This is true in part because staff members are not privy to
all information, and as argued in this article, good partnerships
among citizens, experts and advocates can provide valuable new
data and analysis. It is especially the case in regimes where
elected officials have values antithetic to good science and
priorities heavily weighted towards the expressed positions of
economically dominant stakeholders. In such environments,
expert staff members are pressured to select among facts and
approaches to reach predetermined conclusions. While such an
ideologically charged environment may bring to mind a just past
federal administration, it characterizes many state and local
governments where campaign contributions of economic actors
24. THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984) (providing an
excellent history of the rise of the expert commission and its role in the
regulatory state).
25. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION, 33-39 (1993).
26. PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra
note 1, 54-56, 64-66.
27. JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1996).
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create political environments hostile to good environmental
science.
I represented a group of citizens untrained in energy matters
against a 500kV line proposed as part of the California
transmission system. 28 The line was strongly supported by the
applicant utility, San Diego Gas and Electric, and, most
significantly by the staff of the Public Utility Commission and the
California Independent System Operator (the entity that operates
the California transmission grid and runs the wholesale
electricity market). 29 This expert staff contended that the line
was strategically necessary to provide reliable power to San
Diego, a region increasingly dependent on imported power due to
air quality issues that prevented local power plant construction. 30
These utility experts and agency staff dismissed my clients’
concerns as limited to aesthetic and land use issues that would
occur anywhere one tried to locate a line. Somewhat to my
surprise, my retained experts, one of whom had designed the Los
Angeles transmission grid, informed me that the line was not a
good project and not necessary for the region. At the end of the
two-year process, the hearing officer and the full Commission
rejected the application on grounds that the applicant utility had
failed to demonstrate that the line was necessary for either
reliability or economic purposes. 31 In fact, I believe, the line was
proposed not for the interests of the San Diego consumer, but to
meet the strategic needs of the utility’s parent company.
For every horror story of unintelligent, parochial citizen input,
other stories show that such input forces information on staff and
decision-makers who would not have faced it otherwise, because
they were simply unaware, because they were pressured not to
see, or because the information contravened their own ideologies.
In this Article, I contend that the difference between repetitive,
useless input and valuable input frequently lies in the quality of
expertise provided to the citizen participant.
28. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Application 01-03-036 at 2 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2001) (Application for Certificate of Public
Convenience & Necessity).
29. Id. at 4-6.
30. Id. at 14-71.
31. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Decision 02-12-066 at 75 (Cal. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n Dec. 19, 2002) (denying Certificate of Public Convenience &
Necessity).
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The pluralist view also has its place in the environmental
context. While there may exist an objectively determinable
environmental good (the rationalist view), choices over the
distribution of benefits and burdens of programs leading to that
good will reflect bargaining among interests, reflecting the
operation of the pluralists’ marketplace. Further, the realities of
human nature and of governmental operation favor aspects of
pluralist views of participation if not the underlying theory of
democracy. Good policy flows from processes that give decisionmakers the benefit of conflicting views. The environmental arena
is marked by pervasive conflict over the application of theories,
the underlying data, and disputes over how to incorporate the
resulting uncertainty into decision-making. On these matters, as
any advocate knows, scientists, economists and other experts
develop opinions influenced by ideology and experience. Staff
experts, who frequently aggregate around specific views
themselves, cannot provide an adequate airing of these conflicts.
The coherent articulation of each conflicting view requires a level
of effort, expertise and funding most likely to be produced by an
interested party. Thus, while the pluralists’ relativism may fall
before the unyielding realities of the ecosphere, an effective
participation model must, as an instrumental matter, provide
what the pluralists want—a forum where all relevant parties can
assert their agendas.
Finally, the transformative participatory experiences of the
Civic Republican model have shaped the environmental
movement. My former law partners and I have participated in
many campaigns where citizens first become activists, then
successful organizers, and finally elected officials themselves—a
process which shows a profound psychological change for which
successful civic participation served as the agent. The Civic
Republicans are correct to assert that participation itself is an
educator and a transformative force. In my view, no experience
so effectively moves people out of self and family centered lives
into the civic world as successful participation in governmental
decision-making. The experience makes permanent changes in
the outlook and ensuing lives of those who undertake it, creates
new ideologies, new groupings of interests, and in turn, changes
society itself.
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The Civic Republican participatory model gains special
relevance in the climate context. The now central environmental
effort to slow and then halt the increase in atmospheric CO2
depends in significant part on the entrant of new groups with
new political positions, a result which Civic Republicans contend,
and I agree, can flow from participation. The players in the
pluralist marketplace tend to represent the same cast that
participated in the articulation of the status quo. A mere
rearrangement of which of those existing actors prevails may
have been adequate to continue progress in environmental arenas
such as water contamination, control of traditional criteria air
pollutants, and hazardous waste contamination. The dimensions
of the present climate concern, however, argue for more rapid
socio-economic changes, both to reduce carbon emissions and to
adapt to inevitable effects of climate change, 32 and such changes
require the entrance of new actors.
Scientists are concluding that the threats posed by such
carbon emissions are far greater than thought even recently; the
problem, in the words of one prominent atmospheric scientist and
public official, “has become an emergency.” 33 Efforts to address
the issue will require international collaboration for structural
economic and social change on an unprecedented scale. The
provision, for example, of a minimally adequate energy supply to
the world’s growing population while reducing the current
atmospheric carbon load will require a reworking of what we
consider a modern economy. 34 A society engaged in such an
endeavor needs new participants to contend in a determined
manner for a position (here a common good) that is broadly felt
and objectively determinable, but not represented with adequate
force in the current array of organized interests.
When
entrenched existing stakeholders dominate governmental
processes, the status quo prevails, and substantial change
becomes problematic. 35 An evaluation of the cap-and-trade
32. See IPCC, supra note 22, at 45.
33. Elizabeth Kolbert, Profile, The Catastrophist, THE NEW YORKER, June 29,
2009, at 39 (quoting James Hansen).
34. E. ADAMS MILLER, COORDINATING GOVERNMENT AGENCY INVOLVEMENT IN
CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES, 2009 WL 1342291, at *1 (2009).
35. See PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING,
supra, note 1, at 61.
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provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill indicates that the heavy
hand of coal and utility interests weakened the bill to the point
that it fails to make the changes necessary to reduce carbon
emissions to acceptable levels, yet the bill only narrowly passed
the House of Representatives. 36 Any cap-and-trade scheme will
be implemented at the federal, state and local level, and at each
level, we will need the revised political and regulatory landscape
that citizen participation can provide through the creation of new
and effective stakeholders.
C. The Composite Benefits of Participation
Assembled here is an aggregation of benefits for a participatory model derived from these varying theories of democracy. 37
Public participation produces benefits to society because it:
• Improves decisions by providing decision-makers with
relevant and accurate information;
• Helps decision-makers gauge the nature and depth of
public opinion;
• Introduces new concepts that staff or frequent participants
may not advance;
• Informs decision-makers of the substance, weight,
significance and politics of stakeholder concerns in ways
that staff cannot;
• Provides an organizing device and political entrance vehicle
for new stakeholders who, in turn, can reorder public
priorities and advocate for new governing processes;
• Provides a vehicle for public policy advocacy on the
substantive issues which, in turn, may change the politics
in question;
• Fosters democratic and civic values;
• Creates new group identities;
• Confers legitimacy on the governmental process;
36. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009).
37. There are of course many other lists. See, e.g., PUB. PARTICIPATION IN
ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING, supra note 1, at 44.
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• Enhances the depth and detail of news reporting on the
subject, thus educating the general public; and
• Counters corruption, collusion, and graft.
Although perhaps tautological, public participation is also an end
in itself, viewed as a significant element of a democratic society. 38
As discussed above, not all democratic theorists care about
all these elements. Civic virtue and new group identities lack
importance for Rationalists and Pluralists. The search for an
objective truth constitutes a dubious effort for Pluralists. But, as
discussed above, my view of the operation of democracy in the
environmental arena requires a model of public participation that
delivers this list of aggregate benefits.
D. Participation Must Effect Process and Outcome to
Deliver Societal Benefits
These aggregate benefits, however, begin rather than end the
inquiry of this article. When, we must ask, does participation
actually deliver the benefits in the composite list? I contend that
the benefits of public participation accrue generally where the
participation has effect. Such effective participation alters the
course of the subject process, by material change, or the
substantial potential for material change to either the
substantive outcome or to the underlying process. Change to the
underlying process is significant because it in turn may change
the eventual outcome.
Ineffective participation can provide some of the benefits in
the composite list, although in an attenuated or ultimately
unsuccessful manner. It could be contended, for example, that
impotent participation can perform a legitimizing function. 39 If
participation is an end in itself, ineffective participation arguably
might suffice. Citizens do in fact prefer an ineffective voice to
none at all; I have watched many individuals sit through long
38. See D.J. Fiorno, Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey
of Institutional Mechanisms, 15 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 226, 239 (1990).
39. “Participants may come to trust an agency when a participation process
is conducted with the best of intentions by those officials directly responsible for
it, even if the officials who will make decisions ignore what is learned from the
process.” PUB. PARTICIPATION IN ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AND DECISION MAKING,
supra note 1, at 52.
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proceedings in order to deliver testimony that they (and everyone
in the room) knew would have no effect on the outcome, just
because they wanted to express themselves. But my continuing
relationship with those participants has generally revealed that
the experience is frequently the last civic experiment, one leading
to deep cynicism about the political system. The legitimacy is
thus more of a short-term “hit” rather than a long-term benefit. 40
Perhaps the legitimizing benefit of the ineffective
participation is greater among those who do not participate themselves. While the ineffectual nature of the participation becomes
apparent to the disappointed actors; members of the greater
public, learning from the media that the matter was the subject of
many meetings and contested proceedings, concludes that they
too could have participated had they so chosen, and thus
democracy has been served. However, on some level most
observers know they are watching a simulacrum, not the real
thing. As a normative matter, I contend that such an elevation of
appearance over substance has a slow deleterious effect on civil
society.
For most purposes, however, participation must have effect,
or the potential to have effect, in order to perform the ideal
functions described in the cumulative list of benefits above.
Regardless of which theory of democracy one applies, ineffective
participation fails most of its functions. It cannot effectively
provide useful new evidence or concepts to decision-makers of a
rationalist government seeking the public interest; it cannot
effectively serve to advance the cause of a new stakeholder in the
pluralist marketplace; it cannot provide the momentum for entry
to new stakeholders; nor, can it perform the functions of
legitimization and prevention of collusion. In the long term,
impotent participation will not operate to foster civic virtues,
create new identities, or educate the public about how the country
really works its way through difficult decisions.
We are then led to the question of what constitutes effective
participation. In most complex, controversial, and contested
environmental matters, effective participation requires content,
presentation, and political acuity. Content matters. With
important exceptions such as land use determinations in smaller
40. Id. (conceding that such legitimacy will be short lived).
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jurisdictions, most environmental decision-makers enter their
deliberations with substantial and sophisticated input. Decisions
on complex land development or redevelopment proposals, air or
water pollution permit appeals, EPA rulemaking, or state Public
Utility Commission decisions on a power line approval, both
decisions on and off the record, with or without cross
examination, all are likely to produce extensive technical
testimony. 41 Decision-makers facing renewal of a nuclear plant
license, for example, expect regional opposition, but its repeated
expression will constitute a mere backdrop to a determination
based on a mix of financial, safety, and reliability issues. In most
such situations, the participation may be noted, but will not affect
the outcome.
It is true that in some situations, content may not matter
and participation can have an effect by its mere presence even if
it is amateurish, repetitive and without substance. Decisionmakers may use participation as a simple (and possibly
inaccurate) gauge of public sentiment. The quantity, unilateral
nature, or vehemence of citizen testimony may sway a decisionmaker in marginal or heavily politicized settings, especially
where the ultimate decision-maker is comprised of elected
officials.
Generally, however, as discussed infra, contrary
evidence will be produced with the effect that unassisted lay
participants who express conclusory opinions unsupported by a
substantial factual underlay will have no material effect on the
ultimate outcome.
Presentation determines outcome. Citizens who do not
understand the rules and customs of the forum will make
presentations that have the appearance, if not the substance, of
amateurism, and decision-makers will discount the material
presented. 42 Effective participants must make an educated guess
as to the range of possible outcomes. The decision-maker can
tolerate using testimony, comments or other normal inputs to the
41. CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 325 (1997) (evaluating
whether the American approach to public law “[h]as promoted . . . democratic
governance”). Sunstein notes that “[t]he technical complexity of underlying
issues has contributed to the power of well-organized interest groups over the
regulatory process.” Id.
42. Id. at 325 (noting that “[i]n practice . . . democratic aspiration has often
been defeated. People rarely have enough information to participate at all, or at
all well, in the process of government.”).
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proceeding to move decisions within a defined, if unexpressed
range of possible outcomes; but if the desired outcome lies outside
that range, the participants must alter the political landscape
through sophisticated political and public relations advocacy
campaigns, often, but not always, utilizing political consultants.
Strong, accurate content, sophisticated presentation and
political acuity are required even where the testimony (or another
form of participation) is undertaken primarily for its political
impact or organizing potential, rather than its substantive effect
on decision-makers. In most environmental conflicts, the existing
stakeholders have become sophisticated and experienced actors.
They anticipate citizen arguments and know how to counter
them. Organizational and political efforts succeed where the
proponents know how to make telling points, are armed with good
information, and understand the political context and the media.
The media—assisted by the stakeholder proponents—will
minimize citizen participation lacking in content, good
presentation, and political acuity.
Citizen participation needs agents (usually, but not
necessarily, attorneys) and experts to provide the sophisticated
content, presentation, and political acuity necessary to have
effect. Participation without such expertise will fail to change the
process or contribute to the outcome of the subject proceeding,
and thus will fail its democratic function. 43 As discussed below,
environmental decision-makers require technical input, which
unassisted lay participants cannot provide. Much of the decisionmaking in the environmental arena has moved into quasi-private
or private stakeholder negotiations, which pose barriers to
unassisted lay participation. 44 Even those processes created to
facilitate citizen input, such as the NEPA, now provide avenues
primarily for experts and agents who use the proceedings to
process unassisted citizen input in ways which give it the form of
participation without the substance. 45 If citizens partner with
experts, however, true effects on process and outcome are
possible. 46 Such participation will bring with it the benefits
citizen participation brings to society.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See infra Part IV.
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENDEAVOR HAS INCREASED OBSTACLES TO
EFFECTIVE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION.
Before discussing approaches to improving citizen
participation, we must start with a hard look at the true obstacles
to citizen participation, an undertaking that literature on the
subject generally does not perform.
Unfortunately, as the
environmental endeavor has matured, and as we have successfully experimented with alternatives to traditional governmental
processes for decision-making, the obstacles to unassisted lay
participation have increased.
A. Decision-making Results from Proceedings too
Complex or Technical for Unassisted lay
Participation. Experts and Attorneys Dominate
such Arenas.
The environmental effort has become dauntingly complex, an
unavoidable result of its success. Just as environmentalists have
desired, the environment is now everything and almost no area of
human endeavor lies apart from its reach. The “environment” no
longer functions, nor is viewed, as a distinct subject apart from
the social and economic world; an environmental issue becomes
joined to the underlying natural and social processes it involves. 47
Thus, the human endeavor to protect the environment has
emerged as one of the most complex social efforts ever undertaken. 48 The resulting environmental regulation of necessity has
47. See SCHELLENBERGER & NORDHAUS, supra note 2, at 32-33. Even in their
context of their assertion of the limitations of environmentalism, Schellenberger
and Nordhaus make the same point:
The concepts of “nature” and “environment” have been thoroughly
deconstructed . . . Why, for instance, is a human-made phenomenon like
global warming—which may kill hundreds of millions of human beings
over the next century—considered “environmental”? Why are poverty
and war not considered environmental problems while global warming
is? What are the implications of framing global warming as an
environmental problem—and handing off the responsibility for dealing
with it to ‘environmentalists’?”
Id. at 12.
48. See generally PAUL HAWKEN, BLESSED UNREST: HOW THE LARGEST
MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD CAME INTO BEING AND WHY NO ONE SAW IT COMING
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become as complex as the regulated activity, and now regulation
itself is seen as a mere part of the redesign of society necessary to
create a sustainable future.
It has often been contended in scholarly literature that lay
participation works best in situations where fundamental values
are at stake, rather than in complex scientific or policy disputes
which often related to implementation. 49 Articulation and the
establishment of new values marked the early years of the
popular incarnation of the modern environmental movement. 50
Lay participants who often organized in grass roots ad hoc
coalitions, led the early environmental efforts, mobilizing political
pressure that made possible the odd coalitions behind
Congressional legislation in the 1970’s to protect air and water
quality, endangered species, federal land management, and
related resources. 51 In the decades since, however, the increasing
complexity of environmental issues has made those situations
where values dominate the proceedings ever more scarce. The
environmental endeavor has transitioned from articulation of
values and standards to an era of implementation, where complex
policy, scientific, and economic concerns pervade almost all
proceedings.
Experts dominate, and will always dominate, these arenas. 52
As we moved, slowly at first, and more rapidly later, from
(2007) (chronicling the genesis of the environmental movement and its
implications for social justice); CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY (2005) (a comprehensive history of
American approaches to the environment); RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 47 (2004).
49. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency DecisionMaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 226-227 (1997)
(describing how “the expertise laden format of the EIS may lead agency
decisionmakers to view themselves primarily as facilitating the objective
transfer of information, rather than choosing fundamental values or assessing
the quality and integrity of the information exchanged.”).
50. The environmental ethos is as old as civilization. Here I refer to the
period post the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring. See RACHEL
CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Mariner Books 2002) (1962).
51. LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 92.
52. SUNSTEIN, supra note 41, at 325 (finding “[t]he technical complexity of
underlying issues has contributed to the power of well-organized interest groups
over the regulatory process.”); Rossi, supra, note 49, at 225 (observing that it is
“[m]ore likely that interaction, to the extent it occurs, is confined to those who
are the primary conveyors of scientific information—agency and nonagency
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articulation of basic values, to fundamental legislation, and then
into implementation, organizations of attorneys, scientists, and,
later, economists and social scientists, such as the Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, the Environmental Defense Fund,
and the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund (now Earthjustice)
emerged. 53 This implementation endeavor requires solutions as
sophisticated as the processes addressed, an effort that lies at the
very boundaries of our social and scientific capabilities. 54
The concerned citizen, the angry homeowner, or the
consumer may predominate again when new issues arise, but not
for long. In the 1980’s, a decade after air and water quality
efforts had moved from the domain of activists to experts, citizens
led the fights to raise national consciousness over toxic
contamination. 55 It is my observation, however, that the citizen
activism on toxics quickly gave way to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and its implementation, first by cadres of new lawyers
and then, somewhat to the dismay of lawyers, to teams of
consulting scientists. As lay participants develop new issues, the
movement into implementation, and the accompanying rise of
expertise, occurs with increasing swiftness. The effort to address
carbon, for example, originated from diffuse grass roots reactions
to and propagation of scientific observation on a global scale, the
However, the endeavor quickly
epitome of lay effort. 56
transitioned to one led by the expert staff and advocates of
experts, or powerful interest groups who can afford to finance their own
scientific research.”).
53. See Natural Resource Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009); Environmental Defense Fund, http://www.edf.org/home.cfm (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009); Earthjustice, http://www.earthjustice.org (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009). See also Stewart L. Udall, Symposium: the National Park
System, Foreward, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 569, 570 (1997) (describing the
conditions that “sparked the creation of aggressive national environmental law
groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund and the Natural Resources
Defense Council).
54. LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 47.
55. Zygmunt J.B. Platter, Environmental Law and Three Economies:
Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, Practice, and Societal Governance in
Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359,
382 n.54 (1999).
56. Dylan Golden, The Politics of Carbon Dioxide Emissions Reduction: The
Role of Pluralism in Shaping the Climate Change Technology Initiative, 17
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 188-89 (1998-1999).
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stakeholder non-profits, states, and nations. Only those schooled
in the arcane details of wholesale energy markets can fully
understand why some versions of cap-and-trade would be so
much less effective than others. 57 This is appropriate to the
issue; the growing complexity of both modern life and of
environmental solutions requires the most sophisticated decisionmaking processes we can devise, and those in turn should require
the most knowledgeable expert input we can provide.
It is in these decision-making arenas that this palpable need
for expertise collides with our participatory ideals. We are
committed to citizen participation, and the more important the
decision, the more we desire to know that the ordinary person can
make a difference.
But the situational exigencies prevail:
however strong our cultural and political beliefs may favor such
unassisted lay participation, in practice it is the expertise that
matters. 58 Decision-makers, whether administrative law judges,
corporate leaders or governmental officials, need expertise, and
know that they need it. The solution for those of us who believe
in the value of citizen participation lies not in a naïve embrace of
unassisted lay citizen advocacy, but rather in the ability to
combine the energy and political value of a grass roots group with
the expertise necessary to craft a message that will alter the
course of an environmental decision-making process.
B. The Evolution of Environmental Decision-making
Away from Legislation Towards Contract and
Private
Stakeholder
Negotiations
Makes
Unassisted Lay Participation Problematic and
Ineffectual.
We have traditionally associated public decision-making with
legislative, regulatory and quasi-adjudicatory activity subject to a
57. Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or is it Three?): Developing the
Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer
Energy Markets, 88 U. OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
58. See Yen-Chu Weng, Ph. D. candadite, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
Conference Paper at the Human Flourishing and Restoration in the Age of
Global Warming Conference: The Dynamics of Public Participation in Ecological
Restoration: Analysis of Expert—Volunteer Relationships in Three Institutional
Settings (Sept. 5, 2008) (discussing the unequal power hierarchy between lay
and expert participation resulting in superficial public participation).
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rich tradition of public participation. Government, whether
federal, state or local, pursues environmental initiatives through
the creation of laws and regulations, and then through the
application of laws and regulations to a regulated private sector.
While it is true that the opportunities for participation in the
legislative arena at the federal and state level are usually
constrained to orchestrated committee testimony, the adoption of
regulations, and rulemaking, whether formal or informal, and
permitting proceedings are all subject to public input. 59 At the
local level, legislative efforts are equally open to participation. 60
However, in the last few decades, the environmental arena
has experienced a significant migration of decision-making away
from these traditional regulatory and legislative arenas into
consensual activities, sometimes private-private and often publicprivate. 61 They usually take an initial form as a complex, multiparty negotiation. The results of the effort are then memorialized
in some form of memorandum or contract. These new forms of
decision-making may mark an exciting evolution in polity and an
interesting departure from prior models of government and
They may provide new and flexible
collective action. 62
alternatives to rulemaking, regulatory, and administrative
forums; 63 but they also operate to reduce opportunities for
effective public participation. 64
What is the origin of this move towards agreement
memorialized by contract, and the resulting decrease in the
relevance of public input? To a large extent, the move flows from
59. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
60. CAL . PUB. RES . CODE § 21003.1a (West 2009).
61. This migration commenced with negotiated rulemaking as a response to
frustration with the time, expense, and failure of legitimacy in traditional
rulemaking, but now has spread to other forms and forums, see discussion infra
Part IV.C. See also Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for
Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 7 (1982).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L.
55 (1987) (arguing that negotiating regulations subverts public participation
and the public interest); see also infra text accompanying notes 192-98; but see
Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy
Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (arguing that consensual rulemaking
increases the legitimacy of agency rulemaking).
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the internal evolution of the underlying subject area. In land use,
water policy, endangered species, and multiple use discussions,
for example, stakeholder negotiations are on the increase because
of the substantive development of those areas of environmental
endeavor. 65 Some of these are discussed more specifically infra.
However, other factors that are common to all environmental
issues are at play. As discussed supra, environmental decisionmaking has moved generally away from policy formulation where
legislation and rulemaking, with their established notice, hearing
and participation elements, predominate.
As we move to
implementation, the internal dynamics of complexity, the breadth
of the environmental concern, the level of detail, and the
interdisciplinary nature of the issues operate to favor less formal
stakeholder processes. Implementation encourages resolution by
methods responsive to multiple parties, multiple issues and to
changing circumstances. This, in turn, creates an advantage for
efforts which start without established procedures, are responsive
to complexity, and retain flexibility to adapt to the evolving
situation; all of which are factors that favor negotiated solutions
over more formal and thus “hard wired” processes such as
legislation, regulation, or adjudication. 66
The rise of environmental expertise itself, aided by NEPA and
its progeny, 67 contribute to this movement towards negotiated
solutions. These statutes primarily empowered sophisticated
stakeholders, who, operating through environmental professionals, have mastered the process, and have long ago decided who
should be at the negotiating table and who they can safely ignore.
Consider an example relating to the nation’s (now more than
fifty year) effort to regulate air pollution. The Clean Air Act
(CAA) Amendments of 1970 contained the first federal mandate
that states act to reduce levels of air pollution in polluted areas
(now called “non-attainment areas”) down to contaminant levels
set by the Environmental Protection Agency as necessary to
65. See Rossi supra note 49.
66. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 29-30 (describing
advantages of negotiations over traditional rulemaking, including flexibility to
compromise and responsiveness to complicated competing interests). See also
infra Part IV for a more detailed examination of experts and agents in the
context of Negotiated Rulemaking.
67. See infra Part III.
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protect the public health. 68 In the initial years of the act, most
actors did not understand the implications of the legislation, but
they quickly learned. For example, in 1972, a federal district
court first considered the question of whether the CAA should be
interpreted to also mandate the maintenance of the relatively
pristine air quality in clean air areas (a concept called at the time
“non-degradation”, now referred to in the statute as “nondeterioration”). 69 Despite the now-obvious impacts of such a
policy on power generators who locate plants in clean air areas,
no electric utility participated as amicus curiae in the case. By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, however,
stakeholders had begun to understand the implications of the
issue; multiple representatives of the utility sector submitted
amici curiae briefs, 70 and then, along with environmental groups,
participated in the process which led to amendments to the CAA
incorporating non-deterioration provisions. 71
Over the next thirty years, these groups frequently interacted
on this and the entire range of clean air related issues. 72
Environmentalists coalesced at the national level into established
environmental organizations financed through national
memberships and foundations, with staff attorneys and scientists
specializing in the CAA as well as other environmental issues. 73
These groups in turn collaborated by subject area through the
68. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006).
69. Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus, 344 F.Supp 253 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
70. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, Edison Elec. Inst., Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club, No. 72-804 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 1973), available at 1973 WL 172586; Brief
Amici Curiae on Behalf of the State of Ariz. and Ten Named Pub. Utils.,
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, No. 72-804 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 27, 1973), available at
1973 WL 172678.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7473 (1977). The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
allowed deterioration of air quality in “attainment areas” by providing for
maximum allowable increases of certain air pollutants in those areas. See also
id. §§ 7470-7474 (1977).
72. An example of this would be the negotiations between the Texas utility
and Environmental Defense Fund leading to a reduction in the number of coal
plants. See, TXU: A Green Deal as Big as Texas, 38 No. 2 SOLUTIONS 1 Apr. 2007,
available at http://www.edf.org/documents/5973_0307Solutions.pdf.
73. See LAZARUS, supra note 48, at 47; Donna E. Correll, No Peace for the
Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Activists and the Threat of
Organizational Liability, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 773, 773 n.1 (1993) (citing a chart
from Green With Fear, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 21, 1990, at 31) (showing an
increase in membership of several environmental organizations from 1970 to
1990).
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evolution of formal coalition partnerships. 74
Similarly, the
“regulated community” organized itself.
The National
Association of Manufacturers, the Electric Power Research
Institute, and the major utilities each developed departments
with expertise in air pollution issues.
These groups and
environmental groups interacted constantly, through negotiation,
adjudication, rulemaking and repeated litigation.
In such situations, negotiation becomes an increasingly
attractive tool. Most major issues addressed repeatedly over
decades through litigation, legislation and rulemaking, become
settled law. Entrenched industry stakeholder and environmental
groups long ago committed each other’s agenda and playbooks to
memory and in many cases have reached comparable levels of
sophistication and capability. In addition to the psychological
and cultural reasons favoring negotiation among such mature
parties, the depth of understanding of each other’s positions and
history of settled prior outcomes means that parties are less
likely to take unsustainable positions that a court would
predictably strike down or a familiar agency refuse to support.
The remaining situations involve fine differences about which no
one could predict the outcome of submission to a neutral decisionmaker, especially where the parties themselves are far more
familiar with the subject matter and each other’s needs and
positions than a court could likely become even after thorough
briefing. For such sophisticated parties, deeply familiar with
each other, the option of litigation is unattractive: “We can’t agree
so let’s submit it to someone who knows nothing about the matter
to decide.”
Such parties rarely find such adjudication by
uninformed neutrals acceptable except when agendas are set for
political or strategic reasons unrelated to the underlying issues,
such as, for example, delay. Thus in many situations, for each
party the “best alternative to a negotiated solution” or “BATNA,”
becomes less attractive compared to agreement through
negotiation, facilitated or direct. 75 The facilitation itself has
improved.
Alternative dispute resolution is more widely
74. See, e.g., The Coalition for Clean Air, http://www.coalitionforcleanair.org/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
75. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104 (Bruce Patton ed., Penguin Books 1991)
(1981).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6

26

MIHALY

2009-10]

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

177

understood and available. 76
A class of alternative dispute
resolution professionals has defined and consolidated its customs
and rules. 77 Federal and many state laws encourage dispute
resolution. 78
Ultimately it is unclear, and will likely remain unclear, as to
why these stakeholder agreements have proliferated. They may
flow from the education of the actors just described, the evolution
of the underlying subject, or from the intrinsic demands of
implementation. These alternative forms may be stimulated in
part by the increasing rigidity or paralysis of government abetted
in part by public participation requirements, 79 creating a
conscious effort to flee the perceived burdens of such
participation, or by a desire to streamline or reform government.
Whatever the cause, these stakeholder agreements (exciting as
they may be) have the effect of reducing participation by the
general public. 80

76. The organized environmental movement first resisted, then participated
in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Professor Harter relates for example,
that the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission once
informed him that using mediation to resolve a complaint would be immoral, but
that the agency is among the largest users of mediation in the Federal
government. Interview with Phillip J. Harter, Univ. of Missouri Sch. of Law, in
Montpelier, Vt. (June 10, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harter
Interview].
77. See Uniform Mediation Act § 1 (2003).
78. See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584;
Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570; Massachusetts
Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act, MASS GEN. LAWS. ch. 21D §§ 1-19 (2009)
(encouraging negotiation).
79. See infra Part IV.D.
80. See Michael McClosky, Problems With Using Collaboration to Shape
Environmental Public Policy, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 423 (2000) (arguing that “overreliance on [collaboration] can displace traditional sources of legitimacy”); but
see Jody Freedman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000) (arguing that stakeholder
collaboration increases legitimacy because it produces mutually acceptable
solutions that affected parties devised).

27

MIHALY

178

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
1.

[Vol. 27

The Land Use Example: The Evolution of the
Subject Creates an Impetus for Negotiated
Agreements and Contracts, and a Reduction in the
Role of Lay Public Participation.

In the land use arena, for example, the confluence of factors
intrinsic to the field favors contract as a device for applying
public policy to the use of land. 81 Cities still plan and zone, but
these devices are increasingly procedural, defining the means and
outer limits for public-private contractual agreements. Zoning as
it was originally conceived served to separate uses. Cities created
zoning regulation to protect housing from the externalities of
industrial uses and the traffic and noise associated with
commercial uses; and then to insure that industrial uses could
thrive without the complaints of homeowners. 82 Such zoning
efforts also separated the wealthy and the housing ideal (single
family homes) from housing forms deemed less desirable (such as
apartments). 83
These legislative forms determined the cast of characters and
the locus of decision-making. Elected officials made the basic
decisions as to what uses went where via the legislative act of
zoning. The process was relatively open, simple and public.
Zoning addressed policy questions sufficiently fundamental that
the value of public input was apparent to both the public and
decision-makers. The zone is itself defined with some precision
conforming uses, and leaves only structural details to discussions
between builders and building officials; and nothing of
significance to the general public was left to negotiate. 84 Any
81. See Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: the Kelo Court and Public-Private
Economic Redevelopment, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 40-41 (2007).
82. See Laurence C. Gerckens, American Zoning and the Physical Isolation of
Uses, 15 PLAN. COMM’RS J. (1994), available at http://www.plannersweb.com/
articles/ger065.html (noting that “[t]he physical separation and isolation of
dangerous, odoriferous, or unsightly practices, such as tar boiling, soap making,
fat rendering and dead carcass cremation, was viewed at that time as a
reasonable governmental response to the unacceptable impositions of one
otherwise legal activity upon another.”).
83. It was in substantial part revulsion to apartments (and probably the
people who inhabited them) that swayed the Supreme Court majority in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. to support the zoning concept. See Vill. of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (noting “very often the apartment
house is a mere parasite”).
84. Id. at 366 (describing the zoning scheme in the Village of Euclid).
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other uses that might be desirable somewhere in the zone, but
whose location could evoke public controversy such as schools,
stores or group homes in a residential zone, were left to a
category of “conditional” uses that needed action by a planning
commission or city council. 85 These quasi-adjudicatory hearings
usually involved simple up or down land use decisions in which
the unassisted public could easily participate, and still do.
Modern ideas about land use have created processes much
less receptive to lay participation. The evolution of land use,
especially in urban areas since the 1970’s has increasingly
reflected an opposing ideal to that which animated traditional
land use regulation: a return to the mix of uses within one area
seen typically in 19th Century land uses that predated zoning. 86
City planners as well as architects, landscape architects and
developers contended that separated uses tended to deaden the
resulting development. 87 Separated types of use reduced the
opportunity to mix populations, 88 so residential areas became
dead during the day and downtowns dead at night. Residential
populations had to make automobile trips to commercial districts
for the simplest errands. 89 Mixing residential and commercial
areas gained popular support as people found they enjoyed living
in areas activated by office or similar uses during the day, and
both the residential population and the commercial uses found
convenience and economic benefit in the presence of the other. 90
This process has accelerated as the land use sector has made
such mixed use the rule rather than the exception, and where
85. See PETER W. SALSICH JR. & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE
REGULATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW
377 (2d ed. 2003).
86. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, “No Taking Without a Touching?” Questions
from an Armchair Originalist, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761, 770 (2008) (comparing
colonial cities like “William Penn’s Philadelphia” to today’s planned unit
developments).
87. See Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 35.
88. See Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Neighborhood, the
District and the Corridor, in THE NEW URBANISM xvii (Peter Katz ed., 1994).
89. Id. at xx.
90. For a discussion of the reasons for, and benefits of, returning to mixed
residential and commercial areas, see AM. PLANNING ASSOC., THE PRINCIPLES OF
SMART DEVELOPMENT 8 (1998) (describing the safety and economic benefits of
mixed use areas); JOHN A. DUTTON, NEW AMERICAN URBANISM (2000) (describing
growth and benefits of the New Urbanism movement).
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acolytes of Jane Jacobs have successfully argued for highly mixed
uses that defy traditional categories. 91 Today, in all regions of
the country, cities, suburbs, exurbs, and the edge city, members
of the public live, work and recreate in development forms that
simply did not exist fifty years ago. Shopping centers are being
torn down and replaced (a process transcending “infill” and
frequently called “refill”) with developments with ground floor
retail, a mix of ownership and rental residential above, public
buildings such as city halls and libraries (now serving as
customer-drawing “anchors” as effective as the prior department
stores or big box retail), together with open space shared among
public and private uses. 92 Hotels now include residential uses,
public spaces, and quasi-public commercial uses such as
restaurants, health clubs, and rental meeting space. In most
metropolitan regions, large developments frequently include a
mix of residential, commercial, office and light industrial uses. 93
The confabulation of all these uses in one building or project
creates challenging complexities on the physical and financial
front that are increasingly impenetrable to the ordinary citizen.
Each development type has its own users, structural and space
design needs, economic performance and resulting financing
profiles. The combination requires sophisticated architecture,
planning and financial structures. These efforts involve large
staffs of architects, landscape architects, planners, traffic and
environmental consultants, and debt and equity players. 94 Some
91. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN CITY (1961). A
prescient book that advocated dense mixed uses and traditional street grids to
activate streets and recreate the vibrancy of the older urban centers that the
City Beautiful and other elements in the 19th and early 20th century land use
community had hoped to replace with a greener, car-centered utopian vision.
The New Urbanist movement, following Jacobs’ ideals, has generated intense
interest in the architectural and planning community. See also DUTTON, supra
note 90, at 15.
92. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 28-32 (discussing
the successful redevelopment of San Francisco’s ferry building and GAP
headquarters).
93. See Todd W. Bressi, Planning the American Dream, in THE NEW
AMERICAN URBANISM: TOWARD AND ARCHITECTURE OF COMMUNITY xxv, xxv-xxxv
(1994) (discussing planned development in Boston’s Back Bay and Seattle’s
Capital Hill and the basic design features of the New Urbanist Movement); see,
e.g., DAVID WANN, DEEP DESIGN: PATHWAYS TO A LIVABLE FUTURE 132 (1996)
(examining redevelopment on the replaced Denver Stapleton Airport).
94. See generally Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 28-41.
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especially capable jurisdictions mirror that expert work with
review by internal staff. 95 In most of the smaller cities, towns
and counties, the public entity must rely entirely on the work of
the development team. Even staff capable of substantive project
review cannot typically revise the project to meet regulatory or
policy concerns, but must return it to the development team for
modification. 96
Thus, whether the public process occurs in the quasiadjudicatory setting of permit review or the legislative setting of
master or general plan review and rezoning, the matter reaches
the public only when the pie is baked. The salient details and
true drivers of the project frequently are invisible to the public.
These intertwined uses often require joint ventures among
developers of different uses, and resulting debt and equity
structures that operate to determine many of the project’s design
elements and phasing. Yet, few project proposals reveal such
detail, and if they did, few members of the public would
understand what they saw. The public cannot participate in the
internal negotiations which lead to the precursor documents
which operate to define the project, such as the formation of the
partnership or joint venture, agreements among equity
participants, the request for proposals sent by development teams
to different lenders, the agreements among lenders, the resulting
loan documents, nor the developer’s economic, planning, traffic
and environmental studies leading to the proposed land uses and
intensities in the development application. 97 Nor does the public
participate in negotiations between the development team and
city staff.
These projects do of course surface for public review in the
form of plan amendments, re-zoning or land use permits. The
public presentation of the result provides an opportunity for
public involvement, but one that is fraught with practical
difficulties so as to render the public forum a failure as a place
95. Id. The San Francisco Port Authority and Redevelopment Agency was
given the task of planning the new redevelopment of the ferry terminal, thus
internal staff was carrying this out this function.
96. Id.
97. In projects with substantial federal involvement or in states with “little
NEPA’s,” an EIS or other public document will detail environmental impacts,
but strategic use of that information to modify projects in a material way
requires representation and experts. See discussion infra Part IV.
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where serious issues might be joined. The citizens who wish to
have effect face two obstacles: they are too late and the issues are
two complex. To be sure, it is easy enough to oppose some of the
uses or densities on aesthetic, traffic or other environmental
grounds, but this “first” public forum occurs after months or years
of negotiation over project formulation. At this late stage, such
testimony usually presents decision-makers with an unappetizing
all-or-nothing option rather than presenting a road map for a less
damaging alternative. It is well within the capability of the
general public to oppose the development altogether, but outside
of cases involving major environmental constraints, the decisionmakers, legislators at this final decision point believing that the
process to date has resolved the complex socioeconomic tradeoffs,
usually will treat such total opposition as an unsophisticated and
untenable response. The interdependency of uses and the
realities underlying the effort make it difficult to respond to such
positions without re-conceptualizing the proposal, an effort so
great that it generally does not occur absent citizen expertise or a
well-financed opposition effort using retained experts, agents
familiar with the issues, and commencing much earlier than the
formal process.
Frequently, the true details of the permitted development
and public concessions to the developer find their home not in
relatively accessible plans and zoning statutes, but in a
development contract between the project proponent and the
permitting jurisdiction which may guarantee development rights
over a period of time, 98 and define project elements, project
phasing, and public financing. Such development agreements
constitute a form of contract that has substantial advantages over
regulation for both cities and developers. 99 Confronted with a
concerted anti-tax movement and successful campaigns to
otherwise limit government income, cities want development to
finance and provide infrastructure that the government

98. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 40-41. See also
MARY BETH CORRIGAN ET AL., TEN PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC/PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIPS 10 (2005).
99. Many states and local jurisdictions have enabling legislation providing
for the use of such development agreements and defining their general contents.
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65864-69.5 (West 2009).
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traditionally provided. 100 City officials need a vehicle that allows
them to define project elements with precision so they can
condition rights to develop on developer contributions to public
goals related to the project. Developers, in turn, also prefer such
contracts because the long-term right to their development
proposal renders it easier for them to raise and commit capital for
large projects with substantial infrastructure. 101 Such contracts
form part of the project documentation available to the public, but
are so long and complex as to be inaccessible to anyone who has
not been a party to their negotiation. 102
This combination of increasing sophistication regarding the
built environment along with reduced public participation
becomes especially acute where the public weal itself is a
protagonist in the land use effort. In the modern land use arena,
many of the major land use changes in central cities result from
public-private development efforts. Large scale new towns, the
redevelopment of military bases, old airports, and large, decayed
industrial areas present land use opportunities for cities as well
as developers. Sometimes the permitting jurisdiction may own
the land involved; in others the parcels are owned or controlled by
a private party, but in either case the public ceases to be a
passive regulator, and instead has its own goals it desires to
accomplish through the development. Such motivating policies
could include production of affordable housing, job creation,
revitalization of deteriorated areas where the free market has
failed to produce development, rehabilitation and use of historic

100. MIKE E. MILES, ET AL., REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCESS (4th ed. 2007); CORRIGAN, supra note 98, at 10-11.
101. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65864(a) (West 2009) (recognizing that lack of
certainty in development approval stymies private investment).
102. Contracts frequently contemplate 20 year or longer effective terms,
periods sometimes expressly keyed to the duration of project debt instruments.
The documents themselves, frequently multi-volume, are drafted to guide the
parties during project implementation and in the event of later disputes. They
contain detailed recitals of obligations and the conditions thereto. While they
may contain financial provisions relating to division of revenue from the project
and the financial obligations of the parties, they rarely contain evidence of the
economic models upon which the negotiations were based. They are utterly
impenetrable to someone who does not have some other guide to the nature of
the deal. See, e.g., Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81, at 40-41.
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buildings or districts, creation of parks or recreational facilities,
or preservation of sensitive environmental habitats. 103
Cities, sometimes through their redevelopment agencies 104
or other public development entities, become partners in the
development effort. Often they start by owning the land (as in a
military base 105 or a now replaced in-city airport site 106), or they
use their capabilities to assemble small, undevelopable parcels,
often the artifacts of land uses of prior eras, into land which can
be re-subdivided and sold for modern land use. They may select
private developers to undertake project planning or even the
actual “vertical” development. Alternatively, if the land is
privately owned, cities may play a key financing role, through
property tax-based financing or grants. These arrangements
operate such that cities become de facto or de jure partners in the
effort.
Admirable efforts to enhance the efficiency of these publicprivate efforts have rendered them extremely complex. As the
public and the private entities each identify what they do best,
they tend to assign roles accordingly, and the casualty is the
boundary between traditional public and private regimes. Streets
may be designed by a city, built by a developer, and partly owned
by each. Parks may be city designed, publicly financed, publicly
regulated, but privately constructed and owned. Public land may
be sold, then leased back, and even released again. These
relationships usually cannot be contained in traditional
103. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 722 (2006).
104. See, e.g., Saint Paul Minnesota, Housing and Redevelopment Authority
(HRA), http://www.stpaul.gov/index.asp?nid=1268 (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
105. See generally Base Realignment and Closures Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2687
(2006). For a more complete discussion on how the Base Realignment and
Closures Act helps further local redevelopment on old military bases, see James
A. Kushner, Planning for Downsizing: A Comparison of the Economic
Revitalization Initiatives in American Communities Facing Military Base
Closure with the German Experience of Relocating the National Capital from
Bonn to Berlin, 33 URB. LAW. 119, 126 (2001) (discussing the shift from federal
to local authority and stakeholders for redevelopment planning); Harrry M.
Parent, Commentary, BRAC to the Future; Managing Past Encroachment,
Present Growth, and Future Land Use around Military Instillations, 60 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L. 3 (2008) (discussing local planning in association with population
changes in communities due to recent military base closure).
106. See, e.g., WANN, supra note 93, at 132 (examining redevelopment on the
replaced Denver Stapleton Airport).
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regulatory documents, and are instead embodied in a complex
contract between a government and a team of developers. Such
development agreements, purchase and sale agreements,
disposition and development agreements and owner participation
agreements (for redevelopment), or other contracts can take large
teams several years or more to negotiate, with the result
contained in multi-volume documents. 107
These contracts are rarely negotiated in public.
The
resulting final draft agreements are presented post hoc to the
public as part of the project approval documentation, but the
public itself has no role during the long and arduous negotiation
process. City managers do strive to summarize key issues on an
ongoing basis, but those summaries are presented to councils as
privileged documents and discussed in executive session. The
public sees and can comment on the document only when the
negotiation is complete and a draft contract emerges. Some cities
have specific ordinances specifying this arrangement. 108 Many
others rely on state legislation provisions that except negotiations
for certain land purchases from notice and open meeting
requirements. Reliance on such exemptions may be equally
problematic since many such contracts either contain no sale and
purchase, or such a transaction forms a small part of the overall
panel of negotiated issues. 109 Many jurisdictions simply negotiate
in private without any specific authority. In any case, the public
plays no part. If a jurisdiction does allow public attendance and
involvement, the negotiation tends to be a sham, and the true
negotiation occurs in other ways.
Even after the contracts emerge for public review, it is
extremely rare that anyone can penetrate the documents
sufficiently to propose meaningful change. The contracts are
simply too long and too complex; the text is designed to produce
ultimate clarity in the event of a subsequent dispute on a specific
107. Even geographically limited infill development often involves substantial
documentation. The transit oriented development at a station on the San
Francisco Bay Area light rail system is six volumes long and includes many
ancillary documents and over 100 exhibits. Telephone Interview with Leslie
Browne (July 13, 2009) (on file with author).
108. See, e.g., CITY OF PASADENA, CAL. ZONING CODE art. 6, ch. 17.66.040(g)
(2005), available at http://www.ci.pasadena.ca.us/zoning/P-6.html#17.66.
109. See, e.g., Open Meetings Act—Exceptions, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 120/2(c)(5-6)
(2008).
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issue, not to tell the “story” of the underlying deal in a manner
accessible to third parties. Councils themselves rarely understand the elements of the contract, and rely instead on a report by
the city manager or similar official who in fact cannot fully
comprehend the document either, and in turn relies on the
conclusions of the jurisdiction’s negotiating team.
As any
transactional attorney knows, it is next to impossible to penetrate
a complex transactional document by reading its contents from
one end to the other. Even an expert reviewer familiar with the
transaction type could master such documents only through
arduous work, and it is uneconomical to address a long document
in that manner. Instead, such reviewers talk to the negotiators to
get context and direction. 110
It belabors the obvious to say that this process remains as a
practical matter opaque to the general public. Lay participants
cannot mount a serious inquiry into the merits of these
arrangements absent sophisticated legal and economic advice,
and even then the assistance would require accessibility to
information and processes that are de facto not open to the
general public or its representatives. In short, as land use
becomes what many consider “better,” that is more interrelated,
more designed in recognition of the interdependency of the
activities people undertake in their lives, the general public has
less and less to say about the result. This is one of the decision
types most resistant to citizen participation. Partnership with
attorneys and experts, discussed later in more depth, will help,
but only if the effort is commenced very early in the project
planning process and sustained throughout the planning and
regulatory process.
2.

Other Environmental Areas Face Similar Trends
Toward Solutions Negotiated by Stakeholders in
Private without Meaningful Roles for the Lay
Public.

This tendency towards complexity, negotiation and contract
in lieu of legislation, and the concomitant reduction in
meaningful involvement of the lay public, extends beyond land
110. I negotiated such documents throughout the 1990’s. These issues are
discussed in detail in, Mihaly, Living in the Past, supra note 81.
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use to other areas of environmental effort.
Stakeholder
dominated processes, whether created de jure or otherwise, seem
to be on the rise. Some are created pursuant to federal, state or
local statute.
Some arise from informal processes among
potential claimants to a common resource. In either case, for the
potential lay participant, the barriers to entry are almost always
higher; the processes are less transparent and accessible than in
traditional governmental decision-making.
These difficulties persist even where the process is sponsored
by a governmental entity. For example, consider recent efforts to
address growing competition for scarce water resources in the
Western United States, a discussion driven by the competing
needs of agriculture, growing population centers, and “in-stream”
use of water to protect fish and their habitat, as well as current
drought and apprehension over the near future effect of global
warming on snow pack accumulation and temperature. 111
For more than a century, water rights in the Western United
States have been memorialized in complex water adjudications or
water contracts between federal or state water projects and
consumers. 112 Public involvement in these depended on the
forum. The judiciary is transparent to the public, but operates
without public participation, except those who achieve party or
amicus curiae status. Water adjudications were open to the
public and the press, but driven solely by the claimants and their
attorneys. The water contracts were negotiated in private, but
they were for the most part bi-party and fairly easy to
comprehend, even if sometimes intricate in detail.
Once
negotiated, they were adopted by agencies through processes
that, for the most part, were open to public comment or
testimony. 113
111. See Mark Lubell et al., Watershed Partnerships and the Emergence of
Collective Action Institutions, 46 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 148 (2002), available at
http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/ lubell/Research/WatershedFinalText.pdf.
112. For a comprehensive history of water rights in the American West, see
JOSEPH SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 280-316 (West, 3d ed.
2000) (origin year); ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN
WATERS (1983).
113. Bryan J. Wilson, Westlands Water District and its Federal Water: A Case
Study of Water District Politics, 7 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1987/1988) (describing
the process by which a California District obtained contracts to purchase water).
See also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 120-142 (West 2009).
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That scenario has evolved as parties struggled with
increasing demand for a scarce resource and new claimants came
to the table. The application of public rulemaking to such
processes became interminable. Water adjudication consumes
decades. Parties have used litigation with such success that the
stakeholders have mutually paralyzed each other, so no
movement occurs as long as traditional fora are employed. In
order to escape these encrusted public processes, the stakeholders
increasingly
turn
to
large-scale
negotiations,
usually
memorialized by contract or that neutral and ambiguous term,
“memoranda of understanding” (MOU). 114 Some of these
agreements are public while others remain purely private.
The recent resolution of conflict among stakeholders
concerning the water in the American River in northern
California provides an example of such a negotiation and
agreement. 115 The water in the American River, which flows
from the Sierra Nevada into the Sacramento River at the City of
Sacramento, has long been the subject of controversy prototypical
of recent water disputes. Farmers use the water to irrigate their
fertile fields. Without the water, they could not grow the
agricultural produce now dominant in the Central Valley. At the
same time, the City of Sacramento and other urban centers
sharing the water experienced rapid growth. Increasing
comprehension of the environmental needs of anadromous fish in
the river caused regulators to divert water for in-stream purposes
in support of the fish and their habitat. Appropriations have
been marked by conflict among users and between those users
and organized environmental groups. 116
Legislation (and adjudication) typically provided the forum
where such competing social and economic needs were resolved.
In this case, however, the stakeholders elected to abandon the
public arena and resolve competing needs to American River
water through negotiation. It is unclear how much the parties
114. See, e.g., The Sacramento Area Water Forum, Memorandum of
Understanding for the Water Forum Agreement (2000), http://www.waterforum.
org/PDF/SEC_1.PDF [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
115. See Water Forum, The Agreements, Water Forum Agreement,
http://www.waterforum.org/agreement.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
116. Telephone Interview with Tom Gohring, Executive Dir. of the Water
Forum, (June 30, 2009) (on file with author).
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were motivated by fatigue with their battles in the public forum
and how much they were attracted to the increasing use of
sophisticated multi-party dispute resolution.
Whatever the
motivation, discussions among the stakeholders in this large and
long-standing dispute began informally under the auspices of the
City of Sacramento.
The parties to the negotiation then
formalized the effort as the Sacramento Area Water Forum, a
completely voluntary negotiation among stakeholders who
essentially convened themselves. 117 The effort slowly accreted
funding, and a technical and legal staff was formed, lent by
stakeholders in the discussions. The stakeholders convened
negotiations on a more or less monthly basis, and subcommittees
formed and met as well. The process continued for three years,
and produced a draft MOU that allocated the American River
water among all users. 118
It is most significant that, although any individual or
organization could determine to commit the resources and attend
as a stakeholder, in no normal sense was the public a participant
or even an observer. Individuals did not attend. Although no
means existed to enforce privacy, the culture of the proceedings
discouraged public participation. Meetings were not noticed, and
they were frequently held at times and in locations not amenable
to public participation. Public testimony was not affirmatively
promoted by the participants, no specific provision for it was
made, and with very limited exception, none in fact occurred. 119
Once a draft MOU emerged, a public process began. Since
the stakeholders included public entities and the federal
government was an observer, MOU participants agreed to
perform a joint environmental impact statement (EIS)/ environmental impact report (EIR) under NEPA and California

117. See Sarah Connick, The Sacremento Area Water Forum: A Case Study,
(Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Inst. of Urban and Reg’l Dev., Working Paper No. 200606, 2006), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1051&context=iurd; see also Water Forum, About the Water Forum,
http://www.waterforum.org/about.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
118. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 114.
119. Interview with Christy H. Taylor, former partner, Shute, Mihaly &
Weinberger, in Montpelier, Vt. (Oct. 11, 2008) (on file with author) (Ms. Taylor
represented the Water Forum, in California) [hereinafter Taylor Interview].
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Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 120 The extensive comments
received originated almost entirely from the stakeholders and
other organizational entities. The proposed final MOU adopted
by the participants reflected responses to these commenters.
Almost none of the comments, and none of the changes,
originated from the general public. 121
C. The Dynamics of Evolved Environmental Decisionmaking Frequently Favor Resolution by Small
Groups Operating in Private.
Everyone who has negotiated a difficult contract or made a
decision on a complex matter knows that conflict in these
situations presents itself in layered, intricate ways, some not
initially apparent. As negotiation peals back initial concerns,
new issues emerge. These negotiations require solutions that
weave a fabric of compromise on multiple points, usually taking
enough effort to tax the patience and time of those involved. In
such negotiations, parties develop assurance that they
understand other parties’ agenda, and may engage in problem
solving at a level which harnesses the perspectives of each party
in finding ways to meet the needs of the others. Sometimes the
parties reach agreement only because an atmosphere of mutual
trust evolves over time, allowing intuitive leaps and a focus on
ultimate goals rather than initially perceived means. 122
These processes favorable to solutions of complex problems
cannot occur in a public setting. The slow pace and small group
120. See Water Forum, Environmental Impact Report (EIR), Draft E.I.R.,
http://www.waterforum.org/EIRdocs.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (scroll down
to view Draft E.I.R.); Id. (scroll down to view Final E.I.R.). See also Water
Forum, Final Environmental Impact Report on the Water Forum Proposal,
http://www.waterforum.org/EIRdocs.cfm (last visited Sept. 8, 2009).
121. Taylor Interview, supra note 119.
122. See Jeffrey G. Miller & Thomas R. Colosi, Understanding Negotiation and
Effective Communication, in ENVTL. LAW INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATION:
A GUIDE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROFESSIONALS 5 (1989) (discussing the ability of
small group negotiations to foster trust); Philip Harter, Experienced Practitioner
Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated Rule Making, 1991 FED. AGENCIES
& ADR 173 (noting that “[s]everal participants [in stakeholder collaborative
decision making] have said that the working relationships that were established
during the negotiations gave them an understanding of the other side . . .
Moreover, the
negotiations usually significantly narrow the issues in
controversy so the parties can focus on those that really separate them.”).
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size required makes public participation problematic. One can
design small, highly structured negotiations where a larger group
observes, as in large diplomatic negotiations, but in those
situations, even the observers are usually stakeholder staff, and
even then, the more delicate discussions move to completely
private settings. 123 Any environmental practitioner involved in
complex discussions will recognize this dynamic.
For example, I represented a homeowners association
opposing a large development. Their homes lay at the end of a
pastoral valley. Residents and visitors accessed their neighborhood by leaving the interstate, driving along a long and bucolic
two-lane road through agricultural land, at last arriving at their
residential community. The development proposed to replace the
agricultural land with many hundreds of homes. The public
process, approval of a general plan amendment and planned
development permits, yielded no compromise; the approvals were
forthcoming, and the community group commenced what would
likely be prolonged litigation. Negotiations ensued and continued
for months. The community representatives, the city and the
developer’s representatives formed a small working group, met
frequently, came to understand each other’s agendas, and
developed a certain amount of trust.
The discussion required the community group to determine
the true core of its position, redefining and refining what the
existing homeowners really needed. They came to understand
that it was, of course, not the development itself they opposed,
but certain of the development’s effects, in this case traffic, the
destruction of their two-lane country road, and the loss of their
open space “view-shed” in the lower valley. In response, the
developer fashioned the solution in a complex series of landscaped
setbacks, a landscaped boulevard, a limit on the length of the
widened roadway, and a contractual guarantee that the road
would not be widened in the future. The group retained a
financial expert who evaluated the project.
The expert
determined that some of the proposed solutions were too
expensive and others were in fact financially feasible.
This process required a small group and confidential
discussions. For representatives of the community group, private
123. See Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 84-85.
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negotiations were necessary to force the painful and prolonged
process of abandoning perceived grounds of opposition and
substituting more narrow grounds that were amenable to
solution. The three community members of the negotiating group
became expert in the relevant planning and development issues,
and developed positions which took time to sell to those members
who were less involved. For long periods in the negotiation the
attendees articulated ideas which would have dismayed others in
their respective groups. The dynamics of such situations involve
the eventual resolution of tensions between members of the
community group who attend the negotiations, develop
familiarity with the issues, and trust for the opposing party, and
the slow education those members who have not been privy to the
discussions. 124 This deliberative process would have been
impossible in a larger group or an open forum.
For the developer in this case, the confidentiality of the
setting and eventual familiarity with opposing parties, proved
essential as well. Raising the options just mentioned posed
substantial risks. What if the developer had proposed expensive
landscape buffers, housing areas pulled back from the road, and
future limits on development implied in the two-lane guarantee,
only to find these proposals formed the floor of any public
consideration of the development proposal, with no guarantee of
settlement in return? Exploration of such options can only occur
in private settings.
It may now fly in the face of accepted convention to suggest
that a closed forum provides a superior setting for land use and
environmental decision-making, but surely this flows from the
situational practicalities, the nature of human beings, and is not
new in the American experience. The United States
Constitutional Convention was a closed negotiation. The public
had ample opportunity to comment from pre-convention through
ratification. The pre-convention public debate, usually in the
form of publications, such as the Federalist Papers and responses
124. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
RESOLVING CONFLICT 166-210 (1996) (discussing the trust and cooperation
that is built during the process); David. A. Straus, Managing Meetings to Build
Consensus, in CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 287 (Lawrence Susskind, Sarah
McKearnan & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer eds., 1999) (discussing how to build
trust in negotiation meetings).
FOR
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thereto, as well as the ratification debates made the Constitution
one of the most public documents of its century. However, when
it came to structuring the negotiation of the draft itself, the
conveners chose a private session without public testimony or
other citizen participation, and most observers believe the
document would otherwise not have emerged. 125 Madison,
Washington and the other designers of the session likely knew all
too well the breath of issues to be addressed, and the need to
reach agreement on all of them. They agreed that no one issue
was deemed decided until all were determined and thus
understood the correlative need for efficiency. 126 Finally, each of
them had experienced the intensity of opinion surrounding the
questions to be debated and knew that positions raised in open
session would produce quick reactions and counter reactions that
would in turn circle back on the delegates pressuring them to
modify position before compromise could be fully explored.
These situational and subject-matter exigencies thus lead to
small, closed fora as an option the participants view as superior
to a more traditional public processes that at least nominally
encouraged participation. The outcome may be superior, and for
the lay participants involved, formative of civic virtue, but the
process is private, and intrinsically closed to outside lay
participants who are not stakeholders. Thus, only those citizen’s
involved in the negotiation participate in the decision, and they
will likely need representation and expertise during the process,
or their efforts will be as ineffectual as in other processes.
III. THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ACT AND ITS STATE PROGENY: THE

125. See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE
STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1986) (noting that the document
and its key intrinsic compromises emerged during the convention itself, and that
extended negotiation occurred with no opportunity for testimony or comment of
the many drafts considered during that famous summer of 1787). See also
CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES COLLIER, THE DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 83-84 (1987).
126. This is a fundamental tenet of negotiation and collaboration. See Harter,
Experienced Practitioner Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated Rule
Making, supra note 122, at 183 (observing that “[t]he quest of the enterprise . . .
is to reach agreement on an entire package . . . Thus, no decisions are final until
the end and everything remains tentative, subject to change.”).
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RISE OF EXPERTISE AND ITS USE AS A
PARTNERSHIP WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION.
Nothing illustrates the contrasts between the participatory
ideal and the realities of the participatory process better than the
decision-making process of NEPA 127 and the state equivalents,
the “little NEPA’s”, of which the CEQA 128 is one of the most
articulated. 129 NEPA and CEQA also provide the context for
discussion of the necessary combination of citizens and experts
needed to navigate this contrast between ideal and real in ways
that lead to effective public participation.
A. The Creation, at Least De
Participatory Rights and Roles.

Jure,

of

New

For environmental advocates, commentators, and in fact, for
the courts, these statutes embody the participatory ideal. 130 Both
NEPA and CEQA require that government decision-makers
create and then use thorough reports to evaluate the
environmental impact of projects or actions prior to approval. 131
Both popular and scholarly literature recognize NEPA and its
progeny as revolutionary in many respects: the concept elevated
the environment to the forefront of many governmental processes,

127. National Environmental Policy Review Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214375 (2006).
128. California Environmental Quality Review Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§21000 (West 2009).
129. As of 1995, sixteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
NEPA-like statutes. This article discusses the federal NEPA statute and utilizes
the California statute CEQA as an example of a NEPA-like statute at the state
level. See generally Joshua Yost, NEPA’s Progeny: State Environmental Policy
Acts, 3 ENVTL L. REP. 50090 (1973); Philip Weinberg, A Powerful Mandate:
NEPA and State Environmental Review Acts in the Courts, 5 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (1987).
130. Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National Environmental Policy
Act: Substantive Law Adaptations From NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 207 (1992) (citing Peter Borrelli, Environmental Ethics—The Oxymoron of
Our Time, AMICUS J., Summer 1989, at 39, 41 (book review) (describing NEPA
as the environmental “Ten Commandments” and “the environmental bill of
rights...”)); see also EVA H. HANKS & JOHN L. HANKS, An Environmental Bill of
Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24
RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970).
131. 42 U.S.C § 4322(c) (2006); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2009).
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and the applicable statutes mandate integrated reviews that cut
across disciplines and bureaucratic boundaries. 132
1.

The Transfer of Information to Lay Participants.

The applicable statutes, regulations, guidelines and
abundant case law set forth in detail the structure and content of
these environmental reports, the EIS in the case of NEPA and the
EIR under CEQA. These environmental documents must address
all potentially significant environmental impacts of the
proposal 133 and a reasonable range of feasible alternatives,
including the alternative of no project at all. 134 Impacts analyzed
include those where the impact of the subject project may be
small, but together with similar projects, may be cumulatively
significant. 135 The analyses must include measures that could
mitigate environmental impact, whether the agency charged with
the report has the power to implement them or not. 136 For
substantial projects, multi-volume reports may run to thousands
of pages. 137 This sort of integrated, public environ-mental
analyses had never occurred prior to NEPA, a much-discussed sea
change in the history of the environmental movement, and a
concept emulated in other countries. 138
To be sure, prior to NEPA, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and other federal and state statutes contained processes by
132. See, e.g., Harvey Black, Imperfect Protection: NEPA at 35, 112 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 292 (2004) (describing NEPA’s revolutionary beginnings
and evolution).
133. See Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
134. See Nat’l. Res. Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
135. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2009) (defining “cumulative impact”); see also U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, CONSIDERATION OF
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN EPA REVIEW OF NEPA DOCUMENTS (1999), http://www.
epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/cumulative.pdf.
136. See Morton, 458 F.2d at 834.
137. See, e.g., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Environmental
Impact Statements (EISs), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/lng/enviro/eis/2008/0111-08-eis.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (a recent final Environmental Impact
Statement for a liquefied natural gas terminal exceeding 2000 pages).
138. See Black, supra note 132, at A293 (noting that “more than 100 other
countries have adopted NEPA-like statutes”); MICHAEL MASON, ENVIRONMENTAL
DEMOCRACY 79-83 (1999) (discussing integrated approach of the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) and the Netherlands Environmental
Policy Plan (NEPP)).
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which government published proposals and took public
comments, and had some basic responsibility to acknowledge and
respond (and still do), 139 but the NEPA process represented both
a quantitative and qualitative departure from these rulemaking
and similar endeavors. NEPA and its progeny opened up an
entire range of governmental decisions that had never been
subject to public participation, requiring that environmental
reports accompany a broad array of decision-making types, not
just rulemaking and administrative adjudication. 140 Also, more
than rulemaking, the environmental report represents a
substantial transfer of information from government to the
general public. 141 Rulemaking begins with the publication of a
proposed rule, 142 and while usually (but not necessarily)
accompanied by an agency narrative explanation or annotation, 143
the effort contains nothing like the level of detail in the EIS. The
EIS or EIR essentially turns over to the public the relevant body
of environmental expert thought on the project. This includes
extensive recitation of the basic scientific information,
explanation of methodologies, source references, and appended
source documents. 144 If a project would cause impacts on air
quality, for example, the report must model the impacts, detail
the results with appropriate diagrams, charts, isopleths or tables
of pollutant concentration, and, most significantly, introduce the
reader to the modeling, and frequently, append data in detail
(though rarely—and importantly—the model itself). 145

139. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(i) (2006).
140. NEPA requires to Federal agencies to compile an environmental report
for any “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006). Pursuant to a foundational opinion of
the California Supreme Court, CEQA applies to governmental approvals of
private projects. See Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono County,
502 P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972).
141. See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1119 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Justice Skelly Wright’s early judicial
treatise on the contours of NEPA highlights the important purposes of the EIS,
including transfer of information to the general public).
142. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
143. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
144. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.3-1502.18 (2009).
145. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (2006); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21157(b) (West 2009); see
also Envtl. Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F.Supp. 1401, 1403-04 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The Financial Subsidy of Citizen Participants.

As any project proponent will readily attest, these documents
constitute a significant project expense, and for large projects, the
effort runs well into the seven figures. 146 While much of that may
go to the writing and production of the document, the majority of
the expense represents the effort of numerous experts, either on
agency staff or consultants retained to evaluate the project. EIS
or EIR preparation teams typically may include experts who
specialize in air quality, water quality, transportation analysis,
specific flora and fauna impacts, archeological resources, design,
and wind and shadow analyses, and other disciplines as
required. 147 These consultants charge professional rates, but the
charge is born by the sponsoring governmental or private entity,
not the readers. 148 Thus, NEPA and little NEPAs worked a true
revolution in participation. For the first time, government (and
in the case of CEQA, the private sector through government) was
required to transfer the fruits of their expertise to the public at no
cost. The impact of this subsidy cannot be overstated since the
cost of acquiring the information would be prohibitive to most lay
participants.
146. See, e.g., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON THE STATEWIDE LARGECAPACITY FERRY ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT 4 (2008) (questioning “[h]ow much
does the EIS cost . . . ? The contract for the preparation of the EIS is $1.3
million”); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, PEIS for Oyster Restoration in
Chesapeake Bay Including the use of Native and/or Nonnative Oyster,
http://www.nao.usace.army. mil/OysterEIS/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (noting
that “[t]he preparation of the environmental impact statement . . . [will have] an
estimated cost of $4,000,000.”).
147. Robert Eli Rosen, Complicating Law’s Legitimation Processes, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 973, 978 (2000) (explaining how the Bureau of Reclamation hired
planners, biologists, and social scientists to better handle NEPA procedures);
Eric Biber, Too Many Things to do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2009) (finding that “the
requirement that agencies conduct NEPA analyses may force the agency to hire
staff who are expert at producing those analyses. Those staff are likely to be
professionally trained in fields such as biology, toxicology, public health,
pollution control, and other areas.”).
148. Steven Ferrey, Gate Keeping Global Warming: The International Role of
Environmental Assessments and Regulation in Controlling Choices for Future
Power Development, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 101, 139 (2009) (noting that
“[t]he federal government pays the EIS preparation costs for all governmentsponsored projects, and for most other projects the agency shifts responsibility
and financial obligations for the Environmental Assessment to the private
project sponsor.”).
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The Role of Commentor.

NEPA also created a public role that went beyond receipt of
information; it created a new participatory role for the public,
that of commentor. While the APA evolved to include an
analogous comment and response component, 149 NEPA and its
progeny have created new formalized commentor rights. NEPA
and little NEPAs require agencies to prepare these documents in
draft form. 150 The public then has time, though usually not
enough time, to respond to the EIS or EIR in the form of written
or oral (and then transcribed) comment, and then, in yet another
revolutionary requirement, both the federal and state versions
mandate a detailed response to the comments. 151 If someone
suggests a new impact, the documents must confront their point.
Under CEQA, if a commentor proposes a different alternative or
mitigation measure, the final report must either take on the
analysis of the proposal or explain why it is statutorily
unnecessary. 152
If in the modern world, information is power, then NEPA has
empowered the general public, creating the potential for new and
sophisticated forms of public participation.
Most citizens,
organized or not, lack the means to create the information in an
EIS. They rarely have access to the elements of the project
definition necessary to carry out sophisticated analysis of its
impact or develop alternatives. NEPA requires that the EIS
describe the program or project in detail. 153 Citizens could in
concept retain a cadre of experts to analyze the environmental
impacts of a program or project, but it is unlikely that alone, or in
ad hoc or small groups, they could pay the cost of generating the
information. NEPA and its progeny give them the information
without cost. Even if citizens submitted the analysis in the form
of testimony, most processes would allow a reluctant agency to
receive the information and ignore its content. NEPA forces a
response (although as discussed infra not necessarily a change in
149. 5 U.S.C.§§ 553(b)-553(c) (2006).
150. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a) (2009); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §21091 (West 2009).
151. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (2009); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1–1503.4 (2009); CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088 (2009).
152. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088(c) (2009).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.11 (2009).
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result). In sum, no American statutory system transfers so much
information to the public.
No other statute mandates an
informed dialogue between citizenry and government.
The
central issue is how to empower citizens to make effective use of
the information provided.
B. The Reality of NEPA: The Creation of a New Class
of
Environmental Professional and the Rise of
Expertise.
Despite this de jure empowerment, NEPA and the little
NEPA’s have operated to create a new forum for expertise more
than empower the general public, and in the process these
statutes have given rise to a new class of professionals. 154 This is
where NEPA has worked its most profound change, an outcome
that may appear paradoxical if viewed in light of NEPA’s focus on
public participation, but is in fact most predictable in light of the
need for expertise in environmental decision-making.
NEPA has created a new role for environmental consultants,
both attorneys and other experts, and it is they who participate in
the process, and they who “consume” the participation rights.
The preparation of the environmental documents themselves
requires expert consultants. Agencies that typically undertake
projects that may affect the environment have developed NEPA
or CEQA compliance departments with specialists in the relevant
disciplines, writers, editors, and production staff. 155 In those
states, such as California, where little NEPA’s apply not only to
governmental projects, but to private projects subject to a governmental discretionary permit, major project proponents either
have such staffs dedicated to environmental document production
or, more typically, supplement their internal capabilities with a
retained consulting firm. For many such consulting or engineer154. See Josh Ashenmiller, Paper Presentation at the annual Law and Society
Ass’n meeting: Apres NEPA, Le Deluge: Citizen Suits and the Reported Demise
of the Interests (May 27, 2004) (describing the rise of public-interest firms as an
unintended consequence of NEPA).
155. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ORDER 451.1B, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY
ACT
COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM,
(2000),
available
at
http://www.gc.energy.gov/NEPA/nepa_documents/TOOLS/ORDERS/o4511b.html
(ordering, inter alia, the creation of a system of DOE NEPA compliance officers).
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ing firms, preparation of environmental documents constitutes a
major or even the sole source of their work. These firms in turn
sub-contract with a legion of environmental specialists.
NEPA and its progeny increase the funds flowing to
environmental specialties, and may be the reason that many of
these sub-contractors exist. The substantive design of programs
or projects might employ some of these specialists, but the
environmental documents create a substantial new market for
their services that may exceed the market for experts who design
the project itself. The actual construction of a road, for example,
would likely require one-time employment of a single traffic
consultant by the sponsoring government or contractor. Many
different development projects will generate vehicle trips that use
that road, however, and in jurisdictions which require an
environmental document for such private projects, each
environmental analysis must determine project contribution to
the road in a separate environmental document based on the
work of a consultant team created for that project. Design of a
multi-story commercial building requires an architectural firm,
but its accompanying environmental document may require
employ of traffic consultants who prepare cumulative scenarios
addressing the transportation impact of the subject project
together with all similar projects.
Even where project proponents or programming agencies in
environmentally sensitive jurisdictions would employ such
expertise in program or project design itself, as opposed to in the
environmental document, the original impetus came from the
need to render the project attractive in light of the requirements
of NEPA or CEQA. CEQA, for example, requires that project
approvals include adoption of mitigation monitoring plan that
identifies all feasible mitigation measures, and determines where
in the approval and operational life of the project such mitigation
will apply. 156 Environmental consultants working for the EIR
preparer develop the mitigation measures, and more consultants
working on the project itself incorporate the measures into the
project.
This demand for consultants works its way backward into the
professional schools which respond by producing more planners,
156. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081.6 (West 2009).
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wildlife biologists, traffic engineers, hydrologists and environmental studies graduates than they otherwise would. 157 The
faculties from these schools teach in response to the demand,
offering courses to prepare students for a career connected with
these documents. The class of professionals who produce these
documents self-identify as environmental consultants and
organize themselves into trade organizations such as the
They offer
Association of Environmental Professionals. 158
seminars and conferences to their members, all addressing the
issues surrounding environmental analysis, the preparation of
environmental documents, and surviving the public comment
process and rigors of forensic work in the possible ensuing
litigation. 159 This professional sub-class, almost non-existent
before NEPA, now extends to those who work on projects in
environmentally conscious jurisdictions without an environmental impact-reporting requirement.
These jurisdictions
require a similar substantive project analysis, 160 often designed
by professionals produced by curricula in turn created by the
environmental reporting requirement.
These planners,
engineers, and other professionals consciously mimic the
substantive provisions of NEPA that require environmental
analysis and the integration of mitigation measures into project
design.
NEPA also created roles for another key group of
consultants: attorneys. Attorneys attacked or defended EIS and
EIR documents on legal grounds, beginning shortly after NEPA
and CEQA were enacted. These cases, usually brought in
157. The National Association of Environmental Professionals offers itself in
part as “a resource for structured career development from student
memberships to certification as an environmental professional.” National
Association of Environmental Professionals, http://www.NAEP.org/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009).
158. Id.
159. Id. (advertising its annual conference and a NEPA working group for its
members).
160. This is the case, for example, in Austin, Texas, where no state little
NEPA exists, but “preserving the environment is as natural as breathing.”
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/austinair
port/projsumnr.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). “City codes require that site
plan applications be reviewed for land use . . . environmental and safety
considerations” despite the lack of a Texas NEPA equivalent. Austin City
Connection, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/development/spinfo1.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009).
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summary proceedings on the basis of violation of statute or
implementing guideline or regulation, focused on establishing the
basic outlines of the judicial interpretation of the federal or state
statute. 161 The case law and legal literature today is rich indeed,
addressing in multiple opinions issues such as the legally
adequate discussion of environmental impacts, 162 and the nature
of the burden of establishing environmental significance. 163
Appellate laws addresses how decision-makers and reviewing
courts act in the face of conflicting substantial evidence on the
issue of environmental significance, 164 what constitutes
“environmental” 165 or a “significant environmental effect,” 166
whether the statutory reporting obligation applies to government
projects alone or to approvals of private projects, 167 and what is
the definition of a “cumulative impact.” 168
161. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Envtl. Defense Fund v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
162. San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Ctr. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
No. F041622, 2003 WL 21457054 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2003) (holding that the
EIR was legally adequate because it sufficiently identified, assessed, and
mitigated the project’s impacts); Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San
Francisco v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1988). (holding an
EIR to be insufficient due to its failure to adequately consider alternatives).
163. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2009); Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer on an
“Old” Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. REP. 10060, 10064
(1989),available at http://www.nepa.gov/nepa/regs/iii-11.pdf (explaining how
courts have refrained from clearly defining “environmental significance” and
have rather chosen to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis).
164. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that EIS
should be prepared where there is a substantial dispute as to the size, nature, or
affect of a major federal action).
165. See id. at 827 (holding that environmental effects that are potentially
significant include noise, traffic, overburdened mass transportation systems,
crime, congestion and availability of drugs).
166. See Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973)
(finding that “significant environmental effects” include all potential
environmental effects, not only adverse ones).
167. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that a private
activity requires and EIS where a significant nexus exists between a federal
agency and a private entity); Found. on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a private party can be enjoined where its action
could not lawfully take place without federal agency approval).
168. See Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225, 1241 n.10 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that "[i]f proceeding with one project will, because of functional or
economic dependence, foreclose options or irretrievably commit resources to
future projects, the environmental consequences of the projects should be
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But NEPA created new roles for attorneys as well. As early
as 1980, agencies hired my firm and others to “design”
environmental review and to insure that environmental
documents complied with the statute and evolving case law.
Project proponents hired private environmental counsel to
participate in project design with an eye towards the environmental review process, to participate in the earliest stages of
environmental document design, to work with public agencies
and consultants to the extent permitted by law, to file comments
on their own document if appropriate, to propose findings if
required, and finally to participate in defense of the document if
challenged in court. 169
Project proponents, permitting authorities, sponsoring
governments, and major intervenors constitute the clients for
these attorneys and experts. They make sophisticated use of the
opportunities for scoping, formulation of new proposed
alternatives to the project, and elaborate comment to bolster the
direction they desire for the underlying project.
C. Process Substitutes for Reality: The Use of NEPA
to
Create Sham Participation.
It is not as if citizen participants are absent.
Lay
participants also write comments, submit them orally and in
writing, and see written responses to their comments in the final
document. However, a class of professionals has emerged to
facilitate and to contain this unassisted citizen participation. 170 A
subset of communications or public relations consultants now
evaluated together." (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club v. Moreland, 637 F.2d
430, 439 (5th Cir. 1981))); 40 C.F.R. §1508.7 (1978) (defining “cumulative
impact”).
169. I worked throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s with and opposite developers’
counsel on these processes for California projects. Provisions of CEQA kept
counsel for project-proponents at arms length during the preparation of an EIR
(usually paid for by their clients) to protect the objectivity of the analysis. In
fact, project proponents influence the documents by making their views known
during scoping and, if necessary, by offering formal comments. Once the project
is approved, agencies frequently seek project proponents’ advice during
preparation of required findings, and may allow or require counsel for the
project’s sponsor to take the lead in litigation defense and bear most of the cost
of the litigation.
170. See Ashenmiller, supra note 154.
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specialize in providing decision-makers or project proponents
with tools to create public participation programs. A public
university for example, may retain such consultants. A city
formally reviewing consultant teams to develop a complex project
on city land may look favorably on a development proposal that
includes a public participation communication consultant who
will coordinate the public participation effort.
A project
proponent may hire public relations experts to assist in their
private efforts to achieve public acceptance for the project. 171
These consultants use various means to compile lists of interested
parties among the public including adjoining property owners.
They arrange the logistics for community meetings, facilitate
agency workshops, and even provide support to public hearings.
They also prepare project newsletters and other mailings for the
public. 172
Such activities can occasionally have positive effects that
enhance public participation. I have seen such consultants
convince their clients of the depth of public opposition or the
seriousness of a particular public concern. But, more frequently,
the decision-maker has no belief that these workshops or
hearings will alter the nature of the project. Their expectation,
conscious or unconscious, anticipates a bifurcated input
consisting of the real staff and expert testimony which will inform
the decision, and the testimony of the general public which is
something to be contained in a consultant-organized process
consistent with legal requirements, and then lived through.
Agencies expressly or impliedly instruct the communications
consultant to insure that no one can contend he or she was not
consulted, to insure that the appearance is one of exhaustive
consultation and hearing, and to comply with every legal
requirement.
In many cases, the project proponent may hope (and in some
cases may issue instructions such that) the consultant will
identify nodes of opposition, and neutralize them by identifying
171. As counsel for citizen groups, I dealt frequently with such contractors.
For cities engaging in the regulatory function of project review, I reviewed
proposals containing such subcontractors, and in cases where I represented
governmental entities as a project proponent, I worked as part of a team
including such contractors.
172. Id.
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wedge issues that divide the opposition effort or minor
concessions that make it difficult to continue effective advocacy
concerning the project. Some complex stakeholder negotiations
include a similar “public participation element,” but these efforts,
with their email lists, list serves, newsletters, parallel public
forums with choreographed breakout groups, have the same effect
as such participatory programs in purely public processes; they
almost never produce effect on the main course of the negotiation.
The public is being processed, nothing more.
Without so intending, and indeed usually intending
vigorously the opposite, environmental impact report consulting
firms frequently perform a form of the same sort of packaging to
participation. They facilitate and run early “scoping meetings,”
required by NEPA, 173 where community members are asked to
provide their view of the environmental concerns that should be
addressed in the draft EIS. They attend the hearings where
public testimony on the document is recorded, and they collate by
subject matter both the written and oral public comment.
While these activities perform a useful function for the
sophisticated participant, 174 for the unassisted lay participant
they usually provide the appearance of participation without the
substance. Many of the NEPA/CEQA functions can be used to
neutralize participation. In my experience, professional EIR/EIS
preparers possess strong environmental sentiments, believe
projects should be designed to mitigate environmental impacts,
and are devoted to the objectivity of their craft. However, they
operate in an environment where the likelihood of eventual
litigation shapes almost all stages of their work, and where both
the entity that pays them (the project sponsor) and that directs
them (the regulating entity), sometimes one in the same, are
strong proponents of the underlying endeavor. Thus, consultants
in many cases write carefully worded responses to public
comments to provide the legally necessary information without
answering the underlying concern expressed. 175 Depending on
173. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2009).
174. See infra Part IV.
175. From the start of the process, the litigation-induced environment
operates to make consultants behave as if they were attorneys (and sometimes
induce attorneys to become professional consultants). This combines with the
scientific drive for precision to make the language in the environmental
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their objectivity versus responsiveness to the project proponent,
consultants may respond to express or implied instructions to
draft, or agencies themselves may draft documents to avoid, to
the extent feasible, supplying project or program opponents with
real information, which could lead to the revelation of new
impacts or to realistic proposals to alter the project. 176
The location of EIS/EIR administrative responsibilities
within decision-making agencies reveals something about the
value given the public input. Most large agencies have separate
internal divisions that deal with environmental impact analysis
and manage the necessary consultant contracts. 177 Public
communications efforts are frequently managed by ombudsmen
or similar offices within agencies. 178
There exist arguable
bureaucratic reasons for such specialization, but, while these subentities may themselves become enclaves of environmental
sentiment and proponents of public involvement, through their
bureaucratic separateness they serve the purpose of isolating the
actual decision-makers in the agency from the process of
environmental analysis and public input. Generally, the more
managed the process, the less it matters to the ultimate decision,
which arguably in some cases, is the goal of the agency decisionmakers.
In this environment, citizen testimony exists without effect,
and neither constitutes a successful element of democracy nor
document, the response to comments, as conservative as possible, often making
the document less comprehensible if more precise.
176. Capable project counsel realize there are limits to these efforts if one is to
survive legal challenge, but devices for avoiding clear discussion of
environmental negatives are legion. Simply encouraging the desire of a traffic
consultant to be as precise as possible by qualifying her conclusions, for
example, may make the results invisible to a lay person’s review. The most
significant of these options relates to the design of project alternatives to avoid
discussion of practical and environmentally superior options, and thus renders
the proposed project as attractive as possible. See infra Part IV.A.
177. For example, the City and County of San Francisco has an Office of
Environmental Review. While the director of this office reports to the Planning
Director, all environmental review is carried out via a separate bureaucracy.
Environmental reviews of energy proposals are carried out within a separate
office of the California Public Utilities Commission. See ORDER 451.1B, supra
note 155.
178. See Coalition of Federal Ombudsmen, Historical Perspective,
http://ombudsman.ed.gov/federalombuds/history.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009)
(discussing the growth of the office and its role within federal agencies).
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serves the purpose of legitimization. Citizen activists may lack
subject matter expertise, but they tend to have substantial,
political expertise, and they know when they are being managed.
I have seen citizens plead with an impassive commissioner,
assigned to the unpleasant task of sitting with apparent interest
through an early public hearing associated with the power line
proceeding before the California Public Utilities Commission
discussed infra. One individual urged “please tell us that you
haven’t made up your mind already.” The official, who in my
view, had no intention of voting against the line in any case, and
thus had made up his mind, promised that he had not prejudged
the case. I do not believe the audience believed him. 179
This sort of participation is corrosive, not conducive, to our
polity and our democracy. Advocates of participation contend
that public involvement is not just an instrument of
legitimization of government, but is an end in itself, a desirable
element of democracy. 180 This proposition suggests that the
inverse is true as well: if real participation is an intrinsic social
positive, a manifestation of democracy, then unreal participation
is a social negative and the manifestation of something other
than democracy. The impotency of unassisted lay testimony not
only fails the promise of democracy, but also actively erodes the
Civic Republican ideals. Citizens who organize, come together,
participate, and fail to effect results do not develop a sense of
empowerment or new group identity.
IV. USING EXPERTS TO ASSIST CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION.
As discussed supra, public participation without expert
assistance in the process of environmental decision-making gives
an appearance of participation without substance. As Professor
Harder says, in such situations “participation is not participation,

179. Conversations with my clients, one of whom uttered the quoted question,
indicated deep cynicism about the statement. At the end of the formal
administrative proceeding on the power line itself, the assigned administrative
law judge ruled against the line. The assigned Commissioner who had made the
above quoted statement voted against the project until he determined it would
pass in any event and then changed his vote.
180. Fiorno, supra note 38, at 239.
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but is merely an opportunity to transmit views.” 181 Members of
the public miss statutory or regulatory deadlines and fail to
exhaust their legal remedies sufficiently to meet standing
requirements. Their comments do not compete on a technical
level with the input of stakeholder and staff, proponents, and
organized stakeholders. The process of environmental review
serves primarily as a post hoc rationalization for a previously
determined project design or rule formulation, and participation
consultants or staff integration of the unassisted lay citizen into a
process designed to give the appearance of participation without
effect on the decision-makers. Sophisticated representation and
use of experts can change this trajectory.
A thoughtful
partnership of citizens and experts can move the participatory
effort from a mere expression of position to an effective force, one
that reverses unstated agreements among project proponents and
the agency, and brings citizens to the bargaining table with some
significant power to exercise.
Presentations to government are undertaken for a variety of
purposes, sometimes articulated and sometimes not. Frequently,
the goal is in fact the transmission of the information in the
testimony. The presentation may also be part of a complex
advocacy effort which goes beyond the communication of
substantive position. Possible goals include placing political
pressure on a swing vote, creating the foundation for political
change in the make-up of the subject decision-making body, or
simple delay, especially if the underlying endeavor involves timesensitive financing arrangements. Regardless of the motive, the
potential effectiveness is qualitatively changed for the better by
use of substantive experts, both because of the information
produced and for the impression created by the expert presence
per se. Agents familiar with the forum add to this partnership;
they provide strategic assistance, organizational advice, and may
coordinate elements of the participation. These are usually
attorneys, but may be other types of professional advocates.
The following section illustrates the nature of such a
partnership using the NEPA process as an example. As discussed
infra, NEPA, as evolved, poses formidable barriers to truly
181. Professor Harder, Presentation for Vt. Law Sch. in Montpelier, Vt. (June
5, 2009).
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effective citizen participation, but if used in conjunction with
partnership of citizens, agents, and experts, the same statutes
can also create citizen power. This illustration is followed by a
more general discussion of the nature of such a partnership, and
questions of funding.
A. NEPA Redux: Effective Citizen Participation
EIS/EIR Process by Use of Expertise.
One must start with the hard reality that in the usual case
today few parties participate in the environmental review process
simply in order to produce environmental information. In the
case of physical projects, proponents use it to produce political
and legal justification of the project design. Opponents hope to
use the process of environmental review to alter or stop approval
of the project, to catalyze political opposition and sway a swing
vote, or simply to create delay in the hope that political efforts or
time will allow the situation to re-coalesce in a pattern more
favorable to the advocates. Where environmental review is
conducted in connection with planning, formulation of policy or
rules, again stakeholders want to use the documents to influence
the outcome directly or politically. In any case, all parties view
the document through the lens of potential litigation, either
defensively if they prevail in the proceeding or offensively if they
should not. It is the rare citizen who possesses genuine, neutral
curiosity regarding the environmental impacts of a project, and
only the very occasional project proponents who anticipate the
likelihood that newly revealed information could cause them to
alter the subject project.
Nor is the environmental documentation the usual source for
environmental information used to design the subject project or
animate the subject planning or policy determination. Two or
three decades ago, agencies and project developers frequently
lacked the internal environmental capacity to incorporate
appropriate environmental features or mitigation measures into
the project or policy design, and thus relied, or were, in the
eventuality forced to rely to some extent on the information
produced in the EIS or EIR. Today that is rare; proponents know
at the start the likely array of environmental mitigation or
alternations. Well before the draft EIS or EIR is produced,
proponents, private or public, possess or separately retain the
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expertise necessary to anticipate almost all likely environmental
issues, and make the trade-offs among environmental issues,
capital and operating cost based on internal, technical and
political calculus.
The project, including its environmental
components or lack of them, is “baked” separately from and
usually in advance of the environmental review process.
In my own practice and in consultation with other counsel
involved in document “design,” I found that this separation of
functions flows from the logistics of project review as much as any
anti-environmental animus. Even for those project or policy
proponents motivated in significant part by concern for the
environment, the nature and timing of the environmental review
process make it dauntingly difficult to utilize the effort for the
very purposes the law intends—to encourage iteration and
adoptions of environmentally superior alternatives and
incorporate environmental mitigation measures into design. The
project and environmental review schedules conflict, and the
personnel involved in the two efforts are different. Private
projects are designed prior to commencing the public review
process. The developer needs internal staff and consultants loyal
to it, and privy to considerations which will never become public.
Public projects, whether concrete public development projects or
processes such as a new set of regulations for a federal agency or
a new land use plan for a city, involve teams of staff or outside
experts assembled early and frequently consulted for strategic
purposes.
Environmental review, by contrast, is undertaken by
separate staff dedicated to that purpose, or by consulting EIS or
EIR consultants that specialize in the preparation of such
documents.
Regulations or practice strive to separate the
environmental document production from undue influence by the
project proponent, if private. Thus, while it may be theoretically
desirable that the two groups overlap, trust each other, or
produce information in a format or on a schedule that would
allow the preparation of the environmental document to inform
the design of the project, it does not occur. The environmental
review processes, attendant public disclosure requirements, and
the culture of environmental review staffs make the review
process public and permeable, discouraging early or frank
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exchange of information between project and environmental
review teams.
Thus, participation must begin and end with the
understanding that the intent is to use the environmental review
process to open up a closed and largely completed process, not
simply to await its revelatory outcome. Some citizen participants
posses such a frank and instrumental understanding from the
start; they know that they desire to stop or alter a project they
consider environmentally unacceptable in its current form, or to
delay the project pending a possible political shift. Many citizens
however, commence the process with a faith that revelation of
adverse environmental information in the document will achieve
their purpose. The first role for expertise, whether attorney,
planner or other individuals with prior experience, involves
disabusing such participants of the value or raw information.
Agencies and project proponents usually know how to prepare
documents that, while legally adequate, present adverse
information in ways that support rather than derail the project’s
public trajectory, whether by the manner in which the
information is presented, by clever incorporation of the
information into mitigation measures which will delay
confrontation with the more difficult questions, or by misdesigned alternatives to the project. Thus, true change to the
course set by project proponents requires strategic use of the
process rather than participation in it.
Such a successful NEPA citizen effort requires the
collaboration of experts and attorneys. The experts must have
excellent credentials, and likely have participated in the EIS or
EIR process before. The attorney or other agent must understand
the nuances of underlying environmental process. A successful
use of the NEPA process to alter the course of a project, to
comment with effect, requires, as in most complex efforts, those
who have been there before.
In the early scoping process, for example, agencies (or project
proponents acting through the agencies) structure the required
“alternatives to the project” for analysis in the full document. 182
Agencies, simply though the pursuit of administrative
182. 40 C.F.R. §1508.25(b) (2009); 40 C.F.R. §1502.14 (2009); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 14, § 15126.6 (2009).
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commitment to what staff perceives as the best project, will
frequently create alternatives that show the project as proposed
in its best light. Environmentally superior alternatives can be
made unnecessarily extreme, financially unrealistic, or designed
to
bundle
environmentally
superior
elements
with
environmentally or socially undesirable elements. In complex
endeavors, containing dozens or even hundreds of potential
elements, alternatives for consideration must consist of groupings
of sub-options. These bundles can be “designed” to advantage one
approach over another. Environmental review of energy supply
options, for example, might disadvantage wind by bundling it
with solar which is similarly intermittent and more expensive
rather than natural gas, and might create an unrealistic
transmission scenario.
An early opposition effort involves
pointing out the tactic, and structuring and proposing other
environmentally superior alternatives that may be more realistic.
The successful “invention” and advocacy of an alternative,
one that may be quite unwelcome to agency staff or existing
stakeholders, must be so convincing that the agency or
proponent’s counsel will advise that a conservative litigation
prevention strategy requires inclusion of the alternative in the
environmental document. Iteration and advocacy of such an
“alternative” strategy involves prior analysis of impacts to ensure
the alternative indeed has fewer impacts, no fatal nonenvironmental impacts and can meet the underlying project
objective. The analysis typically requires consultants to create a
true alternative vision for the proposed project and to
demonstrate its superiority and financial feasibility.
An
alternative to a land use plan, for example, would involve land
use planners, traffic engineers, and development economists.
Essentially, the effort assembles a parallel staff for the citizen led
position. The alternative can be presented during scoping or as a
comment on the draft EIS or draft EIR.
During the time the agency (or its consultants) is preparing
the draft document, the community advocates or environmental
group, assisted by its attorney, finalizes the assembly of this team
of consultants, prepares budgets and contracts, all so that when
the draft EIS or EIR emerges, the team can prepare and submit
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comments by the deadline, often sixty days or less. 183 Citizen
leadership and attorneys determine which portions of the draft
report go to which consultants, review their written material, and
compile a substantive and procedural response submitted as a
public comment. In the case of a large project where the
environmental document may be thousands of pages long, the
resulting citizen comment and its appendices can be hundreds of
pages and cost the client tens of thousands of dollars in expert
and attorney effort. Such trenchant comments, produced at the
same or better level of expertise as the original document can
actually alter the course of events, either slowing the agencies
progress, forcing it to alter the project, galvanizing opposition
within the agency, changing a swing vote on a commission, or, in
the event of an inadequate response to the document, provide the
basis for judicial invalidation.
B. The Role of the Citizen in Partnership with
Attorneys and Experts: Civic Virtue In this
Context.
Does the dominance of attorneys and experts in such a
complex intervention dull the transformative nature of the
participatory experience or otherwise reduce the likelihood of the
entry of new groups into the political process? 184 Certainly, it
could, and some proponents of the Civic Republican ideal caution
against represented participation on those grounds. 185 There is a
dearth of systematic quantitative research on this question; such
research which would be difficult to conduct due to the variety of
participatory efforts, the frequently multiple actors within the
183. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21091 (West 2009) (discussing how the CEQA
requires a minimum of 30 days); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.10 (2009) (discussing how
NEPA requires a minimum of 45 days for comments).
184. See Jonathan Poisner, A Civic Republican Perspective on the National
Environmental Policy Act’s Process for Citizen Participation, 26 ENVTL. L. 53, 6768 (1996) (asserting that lay participation forces policy makers to adopt
language that lay persons understand—thus creating dialogue that invites more
to participate. Expert participation, on the other hand, encourages the use of
technical language that lay participants find so impenetrable).
185. Id. at 90 (noting that “[i]n general, the synoptic format encourages
passivity and over reliance on experts. Agencies present material in a way that
discourages participation. At best, citizens walk away from the process feeling
they lack the ability to participate. At worst . . . citizens may become
increasingly cynical and distrustful of government.”).
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groups involved, and the breadth and likely contradictory
accounts of the lay and expert participants.
It is not difficult to imagine a negative outcome, however,
based simply on the usual model where an attorney represents a
relatively unsophisticated client.
The relationship consists
largely of a flow from client to attorney of basic sensory or
experiential information, and payment. The attorney relates to
the forum alone unless it involves the client’s testimony, and even
there, the client may simply present the lines written, or at least
designed by the attorney. It is contemplation of this sort of
passive participation that animates Civic Republican opposition
to representation. 186
Yet, for all the reasons discussed, unrepresented
participation usually leads nowhere.
Fortunately, while
representation, if poorly done, can detract from the civic
experience, collaboration between citizens and a team of
attorneys and experts can animate participation and transform
the individuals involved into political participants in ways
neither they nor their experts imagined.
At the outset, it must be recognized that although citizens
involved in environmental disputes may lack subject matter
expertise, they usually are intelligent, active, experienced in life,
and politically sophisticated, or rapidly become so. Frequently, I
found their intelligence and political judgment surpassed that of
their representatives and their experts. The lay participants
must, of necessity, take the lead in such major tasks as political
or community organization, building alliances and coordination
among groups, raising funds, and frequently, on site fact-finding.
The citizen role, however, should extend into collaboration on
strategy, tactics, and the use of experts. It is the very application
of a citizen’s pre-existing capabilities and experience to the
acquisition of those skills—how to design a regulatory
intervention—that can transform a single-issue and first-time
participant into a continuing activist who may enter electoral life
or take appointive office.
The citizen-attorney-expert relationship must take the form
of dialogue where the exchange determines the strategic course.
186. See id. See also Weng, supra note 58 (discussing the unequal power
hierarchy between lay and expert participation resulting in superficial public
participation).
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The opposition to the proposed San Diego Gas and Electric Valley
Rainbow 500kV interconnect 187 provides an example. My role
was to advise the incipient group of citizen participants who knew
nothing about the transmission and distribution grid, energy
regulation, or the politics of state energy planning. I told them
that in the then political climate in California (during the power
crisis provoked by the combination of poor restructuring and
Enron market manipulation), 188 pure opposition to the entire
power corridor was unlikely to show success, and that we would
be forced into an “elsewhere” argument, pushing the line to the
least visible alternative within their valley. They needed to hear
this information, but I needed to hear the response it evoked: the
group told me that they were not interested in undertaking a
locational fight for two reasons. First, they felt determined to
support the economic development of the region and the state,
and thus believed that if our own independent investigation
revealed that the power line was necessary on reliability and
economic grounds, it should be built regardless of visual and
property impact. Second, from a tactical perspective, they
indicated that an effort to push for one route over others would
divide the community and undermine the fundraising and
political effort necessary for success. Thus, for them, the case
could only proceed if our experts determined that the line was
unnecessary to the grid, which in fact, somewhat to my surprise,
is what occurred.
Some of the citizen participants must acquire substantive
expertise in order to provide the political and policy direction the
attorney and expert team needs at critical junctures in the work.
They work with the attorney and consultant team, and over the
course of preparation of testimony and meetings with staff or
project proponents, they learn to structure the course of the
proceeding. Strategic choices usually need inputs that go beyond
the expertise of the attorney or experts; such decisions integrate
litigation and presentation issues with which the attorney is
187. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (U 902-E), Application 01-03-036 at 6 (Cal.
Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 23, 2001) (Application for Certificate of Public
Convenience & Necessity); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Application No. 04-06-011
at 37, (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 2001).
188. Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning From the California
Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471 (2002).
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familiar with goals, financial capabilities, and political questions
the participants must decide.
Participants must come to understand the underlying
subjects because they will eventually find themselves in
situations where they need the knowledge. In many cases, the
participatory effort leads not to a result, but a new process.
Forcing one’s way to the table leads to the table, and then the
true negotiation begins. Such negotiations rapidly reach the
moment when agencies and project proponents need to know
what the citizen participants want, not in general, but with all the
specificity that real change to a project or process demands.
Nothing presents more difficulties than answering that question,
an effort that requires the combination of self-understanding and
subject matter expertise that only a citizen who has participated
in the ways discussed here can provide. While attorneys and
experts may staff the formulation of goals, presenting
alternatives, setting likely boundaries of success, it is the citizen
leadership that must make the educated choices as to trade-off
and compromise.
Perhaps the most direct connection between representation
and the development of civic virtue is the very fact of success. It
is transforming and empowering to watch an agency adopt one’s
comments, to find oneself really at the table negotiating the
actual outcome of a project or process. As witness to such
profound personal change, I believe that the mere act of
participation without effect, that some contend is enough, is in
fact a pale second, bearing no relationship to the real thing.
C. Citizen Participants Similarly Need AttorneyExpert Assistance in Alternative Governance
Processes.
Advocates of public participation and innovation in
governance have in the last few decades articulated and
experimented with new processes to facilitate participation.
While these devices make participation easier and more broadbased, they do not substitute for the need to incorporate expertise
and representation in the participatory effort, and may in fact
pose greater barriers to citizen entry and successful participation
than more traditional processes. Regardless of the innovative
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forum or new technology, the factors discussed in this article
remain in place.
For example, the movement for processes loosely labeled
“collaborative governance” embraces a suite of changes designed
to bring the insights of alternative dispute resolution to
traditional governmental processes. 189 Seeking ways both to
empower stakeholders and to maintain governing momentum in
subject areas characterized by prolonged controversy,
politicization of regulatory issues or stalemate, advocates for
reform urge the creation of stakeholder groups to supplement
formal processes, usually early in the proceedings or even before
the proceedings commence. These efforts, such as ad hoc
committees or consensus committees, or discussions and
negotiations with no label at all, range in origin, form, and
formality; some efforts are convened through unilateral efforts of
a project proponent, some by potential stakeholders, and others
by the regulatory entity. If convened through the latter, the
agency may provide an option or a mandate of pre-application
procedures, extended notice periods, and informational sessions.
The staff of the regulatory body may or may not have a role in
sponsoring (as in informational sessions) or participating in the
process. 190
This effort, in its most articulated form, takes the form of
negotiated rulemaking. After almost a decade of formulation, 191
the process is now articulated in the federal law. 192 Whether
undertaken pursuant to federal law, or formal or informal action
189. See e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Government in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1997) (discussing various EPA negotiations that
convene stakeholders and EPA staff “facilitates” the negotiation process).
190. Sean F. Nolon, Lawyer as Process Advocate: How to Encourage
Collaboration in Land Use Decision-making, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 103 (2009).
191. William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L. J. 1351 (1997)
(discussing evolution and early history of the Negotiated Rulemaking Act and
creation of federal legislation); Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61;
Harter, Experienced Practitioner Offers Guidance to Participants in Negotiated
Rule Making, supra note 122; Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking
Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 48 S. TEX. L.
REV. 987, 987-88 (2008) (discussing the history of the ADR movement and early
formation).
192. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 561 (2006);
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 571 (2006).
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by state agencies, negotiated rulemaking involves the assembly
by a sponsoring governmental entity of what some convener 193
deems to constitute the group of stakeholders representing all
relevant interests, the creation of a structured forum, up-front
agreement by potential participants to stay with the process and
support the result, and participate in the process itself in good
faith. 194 The parties negotiate a rule or aspect of a rule, and
produce a public report on the outcome, which is presented to the
agency as part of its subsequent statutory formal or informal
rulemaking. 195
These additions to the suite of governance devices can
operate to reduce the barriers to entry described in this article,
but not necessarily. 196 Someone has to convene the negotiating
group, and then make determinations on who may subsequently
participate. Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, only those
selected by the convener can participate. 197 The outreach can be
undertaken in ways that encourage participation of a full variety
of interests including individual and loosely organized groups of
citizens, but the outreach can be designed to discourage such
participation. Determinations by conveners are not subject to
judicial review. 198 Individual citizens or ad hoc citizen groups
may not be permitted to participate. Citizen participants may
come late to a process of which they were unaware. Such groups
may be slow to organize, coalescing as part of reactive process
that takes time. The very consensual dynamics of the process
may cause those stakeholders already ‘inside’ to join the
convening agency or private proponent in opposing the new
entrants. In that event, participants will need to fight their way
in, again, with the assistance of representation and expertise.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b) (2006).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 563(a)(3)(b) (2006); see also Freeman, supra note 189.
195. 5 U.S.C. § 566 (2006); see Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61;
Harter Interview, supra note 76; see also Philip J. Harter, Assessing the
Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L. J. 32, 40-41 (2000) (describing the success of negotiated rulemaking).
196. See Funk, When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes, supra note 64 (arguing that
negotiating regulations subverts public participation and the public interest);
but see Freeman & Langbein, supra note 64 (arguing that consensual
rulemaking increases the legitimacy of agency rulemaking).
197. 5 U.S.C. § 565(a) (2006).
198. See Nat’l Res. Defense Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Expertise and strategy will prevail in the negotiation itself,
perhaps even more so than a traditional forum. While the
informal nature of stakeholder negotiation may present the
appearance of a more novice-friendly environment, the absence of
formalized structure and fluidity of process all present
opportunities for experts and agents familiar with the forum to
structure the negotiation ad hoc in ways that advantage one
stakeholder position or another.
The negotiation or other
informal processes can take more time, and more unstructured
time than formal processes, taxing the resources of citizens who
have full time employment elsewhere, and requiring expenditure
of more resources for experts or attorneys. While administrative
proceedings are notoriously expensive, prolonged and active
negotiations are usually even worse. No ex parte or other rules
apply; parties meet with each other and caucus, and experts from
different interests discuss options in side meetings. These
meetings may have no notice or minutes. Citizens need to bring
the same expertise and persistent professional presence to these
various sub-negotiations as the organized stakeholders.
Nor is the negotiation the end of the matter. While it is more
likely that an agency that employs negotiated rulemaking intends
to take the results into account, nothing in the law guarantees
this result. By law, agencies must retain discretion to act after
the required formal process. 199 The agency, for good reason, may
elect a different route than recommended by the negotiants. 200
Nothing protects the participants from an agency’s strategic use
of the process to give the appearance of participation without
giving it substantive effect. Citizens need a team of experts and
attorneys or other agents capable of presenting their case fully
before the final trier of fact.
More fundamentally, the stated goal of the negotiation
process, consensus among stakeholders, may operate to the
detriment of citizens who hope to influence an agency to pursue
the interest of the broader public, especially if that interest
199. Harter, Negotiating Regulations, supra note 61, at 20; see Administrative
Conference of the U.S., Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, 1
C.F.R. § 305.82-.84 (2009). For a concise history of the process leading to the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act see Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium,
supra note 191, at nn. 2-7 and accompanying text.
200. See USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714-15 (7th Cir.
1996).
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involves denial of a project or adoption of a rule or policy not
advocated by any of the more powerful stakeholders. In the land
use arena, for example, many environmental habitats cannot
support a proposed project in any form, or cannot support a size
or density of development that makes financial sense for the
instant proponent developer. In those cases, no consensus
process will work. The regulatory entity should find its way,
through presentation of evidence and deliberation, to disapproval
of the project, a result unlikely to emerge from stakeholder
negotiations. It is certain that a wise project proponent may use
negotiations to take the temperature of the political environment
and conclude that it should abandon a project, but more
frequently, the developer will lack that flexibility if precommitted to the project due to internal politics or financial
status (for example, the developer that owns the subject property
in fee rather than having optioned it), and in that case may
attempt to use the negotiations to co-opt citizens or cause the
fragmentation of opposition.
In the case of negotiated rulemaking, this intrinsic conflict
between stakeholder goals and the public interest sought by
citizens can be severe, especially in cases of environmental
concerns such as climate where society must make fundamental
changes to address realities increasingly apparent to the
scientific community. The current efforts to enact cap-and-trade
legislation reveal the paralysis that an over-empowered group of
current stakeholders can impose on government. In rulemaking
environments, the informal pressure established stakeholders
exercise may already be too great; negotiated rulemaking gives
those forces an additional forum. This is especially the case
where the rule-maker staff joins the negotiation as equal
negotiants. Citizens may be enamored initially of an informal
opportunity to dialogue with agency staff, but, again, it is the
more sophisticated stakeholders who know how to utilize that
connection in ways that can influence the final rulemaking body
to abdicate its responsibility to pursue the interest of the broader
pubic. More than a decade ago, Professor Funk raised this issue:
“the incentives to make negotiated rulemaking . . . undermine
and subvert the principles underlying traditional administrative
law by elevating the importance of consensus among the parties
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above the law, the facts, or the public interest.” 201
This
negotiation forum, then, possesses all the same challenges for
citizens as the more formal processes, in addition to those
processes, and thus requires that their effort be undertaken in
partnership with a team of experts and agents familiar with the
forum involved.
Other processes such as stakeholder advisory groups and
deliberative polling, though innovative and useful, do not change
the fundamental calculus. Advisory groups can be powerful
influences, devices for true participation, if they have a source of
funds and the independence necessary to retain their own
representation and expertise. Funding is rare, and even where
funding is available, independence is a difficult issue to navigate
when those funds are provided by the sponsoring government or
project proponent. Absent that expertise, such advisory groups or
boards become dependant on agency staff. Deliberative polling 202
involves much larger groups of lay participants who meet, answer
questions, receive information, and then answer questions again.
This process is subject to all the sorts of manipulation discussed
in this article unless the information provided is in some form
independent, an outcome difficult to arrange in most situations.
Finally, many agencies have offices that assist lay
participation in the presentation of environmental issues,
sometimes labeled ombudsmen. 203 These solutions have thrived
in other countries. 204 Many models already exist here. These
include bureaucracies or portions thereof dedicated to
representation of consumer interests in public utility proceedings.
201. Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium, supra note 191, at 1387.
202. James S. Fishkin, Consulting the Public—Thoughtfully, 12 DISP. RESOL.
MAG. 11, 11-12 (2006) (the creator, and owner of the trademark for “deliberative
polling” defining “deliberative polling); The Center for Deliberative Democracy,
Deliberative Polling, http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
203. Gregory R. Bockin & Scott N. Flesch, From Problem Solver to Policeman:
The Ombudsmen Role in Army Compliance Agreements, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2005,
at 53, 56 (describing how the army implements ombudsmen and “[s]tate and
international governments also assist small businesses and individuals by
employing ombudsmen in varying capacities.”); Utah Office of Property Rights
Ombudsman, http://propertyrights.utah.gov (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
204. Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph, How Can the U.S. Correct Multi-National
Corporations’ Environmental Abuses Committed in the Name of Trade, 15 INT’L.
& COMP. L. REV. 51, 27, 83 n.153 (2004) (explaining how a system found in Italy
would be a good model for “environmental ombudsmen”).
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For example, the Vermont Department of Public Service is itself
charged with the representation of consumer interests on energy
and telecommunication issues. 205 The California Public Utilities
Commission possesses within it the Division of Ratepayer
Advocates, which reviews proceedings and selectively intervenes
to represent what it perceives as ratepayer concerns. 206 At a
broader level, the California Attorney General is charged by
statute not only with the representation of state agencies in court
but also generally with taking steps necessary, including
intervention in any proceeding, on behalf of the people of the
state to protect the state’s environment. 207
These approaches depend on enthusiasm for the subject
matter of the current political regime. The California Attorney
General’s office in the early 1970s had an independent
environmental unit to carry out its obligations to protect the
The attorneys in that unit intervened in
environment. 208
appellate cases and initiated proceedings to set environmental
precedent, to create new paths for environmental enforcement
and to create new approaches to environmental law. 209 Cases
frequently involved partnership with citizens who shared
environmental goals. These efforts were sustained under a
moderate Republican, and Democratic Attorney Generals who
supported such work, but, the effort was frustrated and the unit
disbanded under an attorney general hostile to the environmental
endeavor. 210
The work of the California Public Utilities Commission
(PUC) Office of Ratepayer Advocates illustrates other problems.
This small group of advocates within the California PUC
bureaucracy has the power to dedicate substantial resources to
selected interventions in PUC proceedings where it deems
205. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 2 (2009).
206. See CA.gov, Welcome to the Division of Ratepayer Advocates,
http://www.dra.ca.gov/dra/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
207. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12606 (1971).
208. See PETER WATHERN, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 179 (1990).
209. Id.
210. See id. (explaining that California Attorney General George Deukmejian
dismantled the environmental unit of the California Attorney General’s office).
I worked in the Environmental Unit of the California Attorney General’s office
during this dismantling.
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important consumer interests are at stake. 211 Despite that
charge and effect, the Office has been consistently under-funded,
and the more aggressive its representation of consumer interests,
the more it becomes isolated within the PUC staff bureaucracy. 212
It also provides an escape valve whereby the rest of the PUC staff
effort is relieved of the need to represent consumer interests. 213
Any ombudsman effort will need to address these typical
problems. How does one maintain staff élan in the face of
consistent hostility?
How does one maintain funding and
independent integrity? How should we avoid the tendency of
bureaucracy to leave citizen concerns to ombudsmen offices? Who
selects the ombudsman and staff and how should we insulate
such positions from political manipulation over time?
Recently, technological improvements have facilitated each of
these modern governance reforms. Deliberative polling can be
done remotely; governments are broadcasting meetings and
opening blogs to facilitate citizen comment. Under President
Obama, the White House has created a website and a blog. 214
The President himself has encouraged the use of Facebook 215 and
Twitter 216 to facilitate citizen participation. It is self-evident that
these technological improvements will make participation easier,
but do nothing to ensure that the government listens to the input
or gives this participation effect. The complexities, possibilities
for agency manipulation, and the need for expertise described
herein remain.
D. Providing Funding for Experts and
Representation to Citizen Participants.
If we believe in the underlying purpose of public
participation, we must equip citizens with the agents and experts
211. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 309.5 (West 2009).
212. Interview with Steven Weissman, former administrative law judge for the
Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, at Vt. Law Sch., South Royalton, Vt. (July 7, 2009) (on
file with author).
213. Id.
214. See The White House Blog, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ (last visited
Dec. 20, 2009).
215. See Facebook, President Barack Obama, http://www.facebook.com/barack
obama (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
216. See Twitter, Barak Obama, http://twitter.com/BARACKOBAMA (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009).
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they need to make their participation authentic and effective.
With the assistance of such expertise, citizens can usually find
ways to participate in stakeholder negotiations and the other
quasi-public forums where environmental decision-making
increasingly occurs. Assisted by these experts and attorneys, lay
participants can fulfill most of the multiple purposes of public
participation set forth in the aggregate list in Section I supra, 217
providing relevant and objectively valuable information to a
decision-making process sought by the rationalists, and providing
new stakeholder views in the pluralist stakeholder negotiation. 218
The use of expertise and representation to attain the Civic
Republican virtues presents a more complex terrain, possibly
discouraging, but potentially enabling the formation of new civic
identity depending on the nature of the relationship, as is
discussed above.
The provision of sophisticated representation and expertise
requires a system to compensate participants for the actual costs
associated with the participation effort, typically fees and costs of
experts and attorneys, as well as filing, copying and travel
expenses. 219 Some private project proponents have come to
recognize that discussions with serious and empowered
stakeholders provide such a substantial return in the form of
project facilitation that they fund the representation and experts
necessary for the lay participants. For example, a private
developer of power lines in Wisconsin offers such expertise to

217. See supra Part I.C.
218. See supra Part I.B and accompanying footnotes. That is, where ideas can
compete on their merit, rather than on the funding behind them. It seems as if
some have confounded the former with the latter; they think that an idea must
not have worth if it cannot find a funder. My proposal here is aimed at equalize
the funding to insure true competition.
219. See e.g., U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Collaboration and Partnerships,
http://www.epa.gov/innovation/collaboration/Local_Regional%20Partnerships/En
vironmentalJusticeCollaborativeProblem-SolvingModel.htm (last visited Dec.
20, 2009) (discussing the environmental justice community example of
Spartansburg,, South Carolina); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1801 (West 2009)
(stating that “to provide compensation for reasonable advocate’s fees, reasonable
expert witness fees, and other reasonable costs to public utility customers of
participation or intervention in any proceeding of the commission.”); 65-407-840
ME. CODE R. § 7 (Weil 2009).
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affected individuals and groups. 220 The innovative participatory
devices in collaborative governance may provide a vehicle where a
special concern for citizen participation animates the sponsoring
agency to fund the effort, to provide a quasi- independent expert
to staff a citizen advisory committee, or to provide assistance to
lay citizens in a negotiated rulemaking.
In my role as counsel to community groups on land use
issues, I entered prolonged and complex negotiations with
developers. In most such cases, the expense of a well-conducted
and expert-supported negotiation exceeded the resources of my
client. I was required to explain to counsel for the developer that
we could only negotiate if the developer paid for my time and
expert fees. More thoughtful developers decided to invest the
funds, usually, but not always, with an outcome superior to
litigation. Note, however, that the suggestion that developers
fund the negotiations was frequently met with incredulity:
“What? You mean you want us to pay for our lawyers and your
lawyers?” Sometimes the concern was simply money, but more
frequently the developer was animated by precisely the
knowledge that underlies this article; without representation, lay
participants are powerless, but with expertise and
representation, they can make a difference. Developers with less
foresight (or depending on the situation, with more foresight) had
counted on exploiting the difference in expert resources. As
discussed above, negotiations only work where compromise is, in
light of all risks and benefits, a better outcome than a “no” for the
project.
To democratize effective participation, we need go beyond
these negotiated funding approaches to find a broadly applicable
funding mechanism. Such an endeavor would go beyond existing
federal and state attorneys’ fee statutes 221 in that compensation
would have to be available for participation in quasi-legislative
and quasi-adjudicatory proceedings in state and local proceedings
and selectively in federal rulemaking and administrative
adjudication. Compensation would flow initially to the
220. Am. Transmission Co. Representative, Panel Remarks at the U.S. Dep’t
of Energy—Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs Electric Reliability Forum
Conference (Feb. 27, 2007) (discussing this methodology).
221. See CAL. PUB. UTIL.CODE § 1801 (West 2009); 65-407-840 ME. CODE R. § 7
(Weil 2009).
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participant, not the attorneys, and include compensation for
experts and the true out-of-pocket expenses of the participants.
The effort would not be inexpensive. In some cases, such as those
involving regulated industries, provision of municipal services, or
other arenas that administer ratepayer funds or funds from fees
or services, compensation could flow from the subject fund or
regulated entity. In many proceedings, the expense would come
from the budget of the agency sponsoring the proceeding, and in
those circumstances would ultimately be born by the taxpayer. A
few states undertake this effort in public utility commission
proceedings under the theory that, where the public already pays
for utility representation, it serves the process and the public to
provide similar support to intervenors. 222
I believe that in the current political climate such a broadly
based system likely would be infeasible, especially at the local
level except in those cases where the cost could be transferred to
a well-funded project proponent or a special-fund effort. A
serious effort at such democratization of representation through
subsidy of attorneys and experts was attempted in the 1970’s, but
rolled back during the Reagan presidency precisely because of its
successes. 223 Nonetheless, it is what we must do if we truly want
to democratize our administrative state.
CONCLUSION
Governance in modern industrial democracy is complex, and
environmental governance is especially complex.
Effective
participation in environmental governance requires expertise and
representation. The difficulties and expense of providing such
222. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL.CODE § 1801.3(d) (West 2009). These statutes
present many difficulties, of which the most serious is the need for citizen
advocates to front the cost of experts and attorneys until the end of the
proceeding. Even where the statutes provide for an early determination of
eligibility for compensation, the amount and the final approval occur at the
conclusion and depend on various standards, typically based on subjective
determination of the contribution of the party to the proceeding.
223. Some legislative remnants of the effort remain. See Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 1 § 7(d)(1)(a) (2006) (permitting payment to
intervenors at the hourly rate equal to a Federal civil service rating of GS-18).
These provisions remain, but are largely unused. See also 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)
(2006) (provision for compensation of successful litigants against the
government in limited circumstance).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol27/iss1/6

76

MIHALY

2009-10]

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

227

expertise to lay participants should not mask its necessity to a
vibrant democracy. The archetype of self-sufficient and
unassisted citizen participation contributes an intellectually
counter-productive disconnect between the ideal of participation
and the realities of modern life, between our agrarian and antiintellectual heritage and the complex industrial society in which
we all participate. The assertion that public participation is alive
and well in the absence of assistance by experts and attorneys
also advantages those whose interests are served by minimizing
the effects of disparity in resources. If public participation
matters, we must begin with the understanding that it becomes
most truly effective when conjoined with representation and
expertise.
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